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A CIVIC REPUBLICAN JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
BUREAUCRATIC STATE
Mark Seidenfeld
Scholars have debated the legitimacy of the modern administrative state
since its rise in the early twentieth century. In this Article, Professor
Seidenfeld argues that the political theory of civic republicanism, with its
emphasis on citizen participation in government and deliberative decisionmaking, provides the best justification for the American bureaucracy. Beginning with an analysis of civic republicantheory, he notes that it promises
greater citizen involvement in political decisionmaking, yet at the same time
threatens to increase government power. ProfessorSeidenfeld finds that the
current regime of administrativelaw neither allows for the full realizationof
civic republicanism's potential nor guards adequately against its dangers.
He therefore suggests political and legal reforms applicable to the three
constitutional branches of government and the bureaucracyitself.

O

VER the past century, the powers and responsibilities of admin-

istrative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question
the constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy. Congress frequently authorizes agencies to adopt rules to implement
broadly worded statutory provisions.' Courts defer to agencies' applications of legal standards in particular situations 2 and now even
defer to agencies' abstract interpretations of statutory provisions. 3 The
4
President is often unable to mandate that agencies adopt her policies.
* Visiting Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; Assistant Professor, Florida State
College of Law. I owe thanks to numerous colleagues who read and commented on earlier
drafts, but I would like to express special appreciation to Rob Atdnson for his encouragement
and numerous insights. I would also like to thank Lisa Kuhlman and Karin Carlson for their
dedicated research assistance.
I See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, I5 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1988) (requiring the FTC
to "prevent persons . . . from using unfair methods of competition"); Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. § 824e(a) (i988) (requiring the FERC to set electricity transmission wholesale electric
rates that are "just and reasonable" and not "unduly discriminatory"); Federal Communication
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988) (requiring the FCC to regulate broadcasting "as the public convenience, interest or necessity requires"); see also Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule
of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 427-30 (1989)(describing the shift
from congressional standard-setting to congressional delegation to agencies, which then set the
standards themselves).
2 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).

3See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-45 (1984); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565-69 (ig8o).
4Legislation passed by Congress defines and limits agency power to act, and the agency
must regulate in accordance with its enabling statute. The President cannot legally make a
decision that Congress has entrusted to an agency; she can only try to persuade the agency to
decide as she would like. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-96 (1988). The President
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In short, in the modern state, many agency decisions involve political
choices that "make law," even though agencies exist outside traditional
conceptions of our tripartite national government.
The political nature of agency decisions has sparked controversy
about the extent to which American constitutional democracy should
permit unelected administrators to define fundamental regulatory policies.5 Supporters of the bureaucratic state have at different times
offered three distinct justifications for administrative lawmaking. Before the New Deal, commentators claimed that agency authority to
issue rules in narrow regulatory areas was necessary to fulfill explicit
congressional policy. 6 The New Deal, however, granted agencies policymaking authority that clearly exceeded the bounds justified by
necessity. New Dealers, forced to find an alternative justification,
asserted that agency decisions were applications of technical expertise,
best made outside an environment influenced by interest groups and
the political process. 7 This justification, however, ignored the reality
that most agency decisions did not follow from uncontroversial expert
evaluation, but rather hinged on outside influence and the political
leanings of agency members. The realization that agencies act politically spawned a third justification for the administrative state that
drew upon the political theory of pluralistic democracy, which likens
political processes to markets. 8 Delegation of political decisions to

has no direct authority over "independent agencies"; she can neither dictate her policies to them
nor remove agency members, except for statutorily defined cause, and removal is reviewable by
the courts. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935). The
President does have the authority to remove the heads of "executive agencies" at will but
pragmatically this still does not give her the power to dictate agency policy. A President might
face great political pressure if she removed an agency head for adopting a policy with which
the President disagreed after the agency had developed a record and carefully explained how
that policy furthered the enabling statute's goals. Cf. MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS? 112 (1988) (noting that the participants in a rulemaking proceeding would be
"outraged" if at the end the President simply told the agency which rule to adopt). Furthermore,
the President might not want to replace the agency head if she otherwise considers the agency
head to be effective.

Finally, replacing the agency head will only have an effect if the President

can be sure that she can get the Senate to approve the appointment of a replacement who will
heed the President's command. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587-91
(1984) (discussing presidential direction of agencies).
5 See, e.g., THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); James 0.
Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 307, 307309 (976); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV.
1276, 1279-80 (1984).
6 See FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES 325-26 (i905); A. A. Berle, Jr., The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30
HARv. L. REV. 430, 441-42 (1917).
7 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 142-43 (1938).
8 See JAMES M.

BUCHANAN

& GORDON

TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL

FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 288-89 (1965).
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agencies was defended as a means of reaching the efficient regulatory
equilibrium. 9
All of these defenses of agency policymaking explain and justify
some existing congressional delegations of lawmaking functions to
agencies and judicial deference to agency decisions. None of the
arguments, however, account for delegations that are prompted by
neither a need for technical expertise nor a desire for agency dealmaking to resolve regulatory issues.
Recently, commentators have proffered an alternative understanding of the constitutional constraints on government regulation - the
"civic republican" theory of constitutional democracy. 10 Modern civic
republicans view the Constitution as an attempt to ensure that government decisions are a product of deliberation that respects and
reflects the values of all members of society. Civic republicanism
promises democratic government that does not exclude or coerce citizens whose backgrounds and values differ from those of mainstream
society." The civic republican model rejects the pluralistic assertion
that government can, at best, implement deals that divide political
spoils according to the pre-political preferences of interest groups.
Instead, government's primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry
to deliberate about altering preferences and to reach consensus on the
common good. 12
One prominent proponent of civic republicanism, Cass Sunstein,
has noted that it tolerates regulation by an extensive bureaucracy more
than does pluralist theory. 13 Yet Sunstein adheres to the traditional
9 For the historical development of these justifications and models for administrative decisionmaking, see SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 36-54; and Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-88 (1975).
1o See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAv 102-03 (I988); Bruce

A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lecture: Discovering The Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1032-43
(1984); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, z985 Term - Foreword: Traces Of SelfGovernment, xoo HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-77 (I986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 45-48 (1985). See generally Symposium, The Republican
Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (detailing most aspects of civic republican theory).
This revival is part of a more general rekindling of interest in republicanism in constitutional
history, see, e.g., DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 4-7 (1984);
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 5o6-52 (1975); Robert E. Shahope, Toward a

Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American
Historiography,29 WM. & MARY Q. 49, 49 (1972), and philosophical justifications for the state,
see, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 171-83 (1982); Drucilla

Cornell, Toward a ModernlPostmodernReconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 35980 (1985); Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308,
320-22 (1985).
11See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1513 (1988).

12See id. at 1526-28; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1548-49 (1988).
13 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 107-10 (1990); Sunstein,

supra note io, at 59-64; cf. Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation:
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principle that "basic value judgments should be made by Congress. ' 14
Sunstein thus seems to accept the bureaucracy as an unavoidable
aspect of modern government and has set about the task of constraining administrative policy-setting discretion to fit within civic republicanism to the extent possible. 5
By contrast, I believe that civic republicanism provides a strong
justification for the assignment of broad policymaking discretion to
administrative agencies. I agree with Sunstein that "[t]he exact
amount of desirable agency discretion . . . will depend on the con-

text."1 6 But I contend that, on the whole, civic republicanism is
consistent with broad delegations of political decisionmaking authority
to officials with greater expertise and fewer immediate political pressures than directly elected officials or legislators. Moreover, given the
current ethic that approves of the private pursuit of self-interest as a
means of making social policy, reliance on a more politically isolated
administrative state may be necessary to implement something approaching the civic republican ideal.
I do not mean to imply that the politically accountable institutions
-

Congress and the President

-

play no role in my civic republican

conception of the administrative state. They, as well as the judiciary,
however, are not geared to implement the civic republican ideal directly. Instead, the three branches play a crucial role in my conception
by reviewing agency policy to ensure that the bureaucracy does not
fail to fulfill its civic republican promise.
In sum, I view the civic republican conception as providing an
essential justification for the modern bureaucratic state. 17 This Article
argues that although the Congress, the President, and the courts retain
an important reviewing function, having administrative agencies set
government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic republicanism's call for deliberative decisionmaking informed by the
values of the entire polity. Is
An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617, 1631-41 (1985) (noting the potential of administrative
agencies to foster public deliberation about policy decisions).
14Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 927,
941.
IsSee, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since
1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 281-92 (1986); Sunstein, supra note io, at 74-75.
16 Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 941.
17 This does not mean that civic republicanism justifies the administrative state as it presently

operates. I agree with Sunstein that many of the doctrines governii.g administrative decisionmaking reflect a pluralistic understanding of democracy and therefore should be modified. See,
e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 107-1o; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 503-04 (989). I do not agree, however, with his
principle that statutes should be interpreted to narrow agency discretion to set policy. See id.
at 470.
IsChristopher Edley has reached somewhat similar conclusions about the role of agencies,
courts, and Congress. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING

1516

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1{511

This thesis has several implications for public policy. First, it
suggests that congressional and judicial efforts to limit agency discretion and thereby eliminate perceived problems with the legitimacy of
agency policymaking are often misguided. Second, if administrative
policy-setting is to achieve the civic republican ideal, agency decisionmaking processes must proceed in a manner consistent with civic
republican theory. Hence, my thesis suggests the need for numerous
changes in administrative law. For example, Congress should amend
the Administrative Procedure Act 19 to require public involvement in
the early stages of agency policy formulation. Congress should also
require that its members and the White House staff reveal all of their
interactions with agency personnel. Courts should abandon the rigid
dichotomy that they draw between agency decisions of law and decisions of policy, and should review both for persuasiveness in light
of pragmatic limitations.
The Article begins by reviewing the failure of traditional political
theory to justify the broad grants of policy-setting authority that characterize the present administrative state. It proceeds to review civic
republican theory and to make explicit both its promises and pitfalls.
It then illustrates how broad grants of administrative discretion can
provide a means of fulfilling the promises of civic republicanism.
Finally, the Article evaluates the potential for policymaking by an
administrative state to stumble into the theory's pitfalls.

I. THE SHAKY CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

The most traditional, and historically the first, justification for
administrative policymaking authority asserts that the federal bureaucracy is necessary to implement Congress's political decisions, which
are embodied in the statutes Congress passes. Under this "transmission belt" conception, agencies merely carry out Congress's statutory
plan and do not themselves exercise political judgment. 20 Thus,
agency actions must follow statutory directives that dictate the appropriate decision for any given factual context. The agency must use
procedures that ensure an accurate assessment of the facts so that it
does not misapply statutory policy. Judicial review guards against
agency decisions that deviate from legislatively determined policy.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 221-34 (i990); see also Christopher Edley, Jr., The

Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and PoliticalIdeology, r991 DUKE L.J. 561, 588-98 (discussing
the relationship of his "sound governance" standard to a civic republican conception of the
administrative state).
19 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-7o6 (1988).
20 See Stewart, supra note 9, at 1672-76.
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Judicial affirmation of agency orders also alleviates concerns about
their legitimacy, because the Constitution, which represents the social
compact to which "the People" agreed, envisions binding judicial or21
ders.
Under the transmission belt model, agencies exercise only the discretion necessary to implement Congress's statutory directives. 22 This
discretion is not a delegation of the legislative function, even if the
agency engages in "quasi-legislative" activity, such as setting rates or
prescribing rules to govern conduct in narrow, fact-specific situations,
because this activity merely brings to fruition Congress's political
choice rather than some competing conception of what is best.
The transmission belt conception is seriously flawed. Arguably, it
recognizes that even when Congress provides a detailed statutory
prescription, agencies must exercise some judgment in implementing
and enforcing it. The notion, however, that an agency can exercise
judgment in implementing statutes without influencing and reshaping
the political balance struck by Congress is, in most instances, a fiction.
For example, in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,23
Congress laid down a clear policy that mandated that ambient levels
of toxic substances in the workplace be kept at the lowest levels
feasible. 24 Even as moderated by the Supreme Court, 25 the policy,
when strictly enforced, often requires great expenditures to reduce
health risks only marginally. 26 To avoid these outcomes, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has simply declined to initiate proceedings to set workplace standards for many
toxic substances. 2 7 Hence, despite the clarity and inflexibility of the
congressional policy (or perhaps even because of it), the agency has
used its enforcement discretion to alter sharply that policy.
The transition belt model is also incomplete. Viewing agency
discretion as a means of implementing congressional policy justifies
only limited congressional delegation. It does not legitimate congres-

21 See id. at 1674-76.
22 The usual exposition of the transmission belt model gives the impression that agencies

should exercise no discretion. See id. at 1675. The model, however, clearly envisions that the
agency will make some choices, see id. at 1676, and hence will exercise some judgment. The
key to the transmission belt model is that agency discretion is tied to assessing factual circumstances and not to making or construing law or policy.
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
24 See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988).
25 See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 63940 (1980) (plurality opinion).
26 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 86, 239-40; John Mendeloff, Regulatory Reform and

OSHA Policy, 5 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 440, 441-42 (1986) (noting that the average cost
of preventing one cancer fatality runs from several million to twenty million dollars).
27 See JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION 2 (1988);
SUNSTEIN,

supra note x3, at 91-92.
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sional reliance on agency expertise to make fundamental policy decisions. Nor does it justify the assignment of politically charged decisions to agencies. In reality, however, Congress commonly fails to
make hard political choices when it passes a regulatory statute, thus
necessitating that the agency responsible for implementing the law do
So.28 Requiring government to conform to the transmission belt model
would lead to the invalidation of many of the regulatory programs on
which society relies, 29 and would likely lead to congressional inertia
even in the many situations in which30 all agree that some regulatory
change is better than the status quo.
The second, New Deal-era justification of bureaucratic decisionmaking relies on the concept of agency expertise. 3 1 It recognizes that
agency decisions do alter and, to a great extent, even determine the
values ultimately promoted by regulation, but it regards this state of
affairs as salutary. 32 Successful solutions to regulatory problems require the application of knowledge and experience that only agencies
involved in day-to-day regulation of an industry can acquire, 33 as well
as insulation from political and legal constraints that only get in the
way of good government. 34 Hence, the New Deal contemplated that
Congress should identify an area in need of regulatory control and
turn the expert agency loose to regulate. 35 The statutory and judicial
28 See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-32 (ig8o); Lloyd N. Cutler & David
R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1400 (1975).
29 The transmission belt model of administration was the basis for the non-delegation doc-

trine, which the Supreme Court applied for a brief period in 1935 in a vain attempt to block
the New Deal vision of the administrative state. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation
Stewart and Richard Pierce seem to
Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 326 & n.2o (987).

agree that application of a recently proposed version of the doctrine would invalidate most
existing federal regulatory statutes. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and
Delegated Power:A Response to ProfessorLowi, 36 AM.U. L. REv. 391, 401-02 (1987); Stewart,
supra, at 325.
30 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 46-58 (1982).
31 See MARVER

H.

BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 51

(1955); LANDIS, supra note 7, at 23-24; Daniel J. Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A
History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REv. 299, 3o6-07 (1983).

-2See LANDIS, supra note 7, at 70 (arguing that setting detailed standards is better done "in
the comparative quiet of a conference room than ... amid the turmoil of a legislative chamber
or committee room"). Supreme Court decisions during this period aptly express this attitude.
See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
33See LANDIS, supra note 7, at 23-24.
34 See JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 59-60 (1978) (noting that political scientists had called for the independence of agencies prior to the New Deal); LANDIS, supra note 7, at 113-14; SELECTED
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF JOSEPH B. EASTMAN 1942-44, at 375 (G. Lloyd Wilson ed., 1948);
cf. BERNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 51-52 (chronicling the relationship of the Progressive call for

administrative independence to the New Deal administrative state).
35Under the New Deal model, the agency's enabling act might provide limits on the scope
of agency discretion. See LANDIS, supra note 7, at 52-60. But in many areas of regulation,
the architects of the New Deal believed that the enabling act should merely authorize the agency
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checks so important to the transmission belt model gave way to a
faith that the "professional spirit" of New Deal regulators would deter
36
them from setting unwise or excessively intrusive policy.
Under the New Deal model, any deviation of a regulatory scheme
from Congress's original conception does not derogate Congress's political choices, but rather results from the agency's superior information and technical capabilities. Although an agency's discretionary
decisions do alter the ends promoted by a statutory scheme, the expertise justification implicitly assumes that if only everyone had the
same information and expertise possessed by the agency, everyone
would agree that such alterations execute the "will of the people." In
essence, agency alterations in statutory policy reflect only technical
assessments made outside the pressure of politics and are therefore
value-neutral. 3 7 In this sense, agency discretion to alter policy does
not conflict with the Constitution's assignment of lawmaking power
to the legislature.
The establishment of the Federal Radio Commission and its successor, the Federal Communications Commission, exemplifies congressional reliance on agency expertise to set policy.38 Congress enacted
a regulatory scheme under which the Commission would grant licenses
to serve "the public convenience, interest or necessity." 3 9 The Commission, however, has unbridled discretion to delineate what the public interest requires. For example, it was the Commission and not
Congress that chose to emphasize the policy of diversity and local
control of programming that still dictates the structure of our broad40
casting system.
Despite occasional instances when Congress seems to view agency
expertise as a value-neutral means of reaching regulatory policy decisions, the New Dealers' justification also fails to explain many delegations of discretion that have become common in the past century.
Technical assessments help identify the set of possible choices the
agency faces and often elucidate the implications of those choices.

to regulate some industry or area of the economy, and it was best for the statute merely to
specify that the agency further the "public interest." See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 38.
-6 See LANDIS, supra note 7, at 99.
37 See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 277-80 (1967).
38 See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 136-38 (1940).
39 Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 4, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163-64. That standard was retained in
1934 when Congress passed the Federal Communications Act, which created the FCC, see
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 303, 48 Stat. io64, io82-83, and it is still in existence
today, see 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
40 Despite the absence of an explicit statutory prescription of diversity and local control, the
FCC has made it clear by rule and by particular licensing decisions that these factors would
often be determinative. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, x F.C.C.2d
393, 394 (1965); MARc A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW 762-63 (4 th
ed. i99o).

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1520

[Vol. 105:151

When all is said and done, however, expertise rarely eliminates the
need for the agency to choose among competing values - a choice
that is the essence of political decisionmaking. 4 1
The discretion accorded to the Federal Communications Commission with respect to broadcast regulation illustrates the problem of
agencies making value choices. Armed with the mandate to issue
licenses in the public interest, the FCC formulated the notion that
licensees controlled a public trust. As trustees, broadcasters were
required to air programs that fulfilled their social responsibilities. In
particular, they had to comply with the FCC's "fairness doctrine" by
providing a "'reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance.' ' 42 Adoption of this requirement
resulted from the FCC's balancing of broadcaster freedom from gov43
ernment control against the need for responsible use of the airwaves.
The choice between the public trust approach and a more laissez-faire
approach to programming was not a matter of agency expertise, but
rather a value choice about the social role that the broadcasting system
should play.
Not only do FCC policies present clear examples of agency decisions based on political choices rather than mere technical expertise,
but the supposed independence of the Commission also does little to
shield its decisionmaking processes from blatant political influence.
For example, the Commission's initial (albeit short-lived) rules governing cable television were "based on a private agreement among
cable operators, broadcasters, and a group of copyright owners,"
adopted after prodding by the Nixon White House. 44 Political influence also seems to have reached even the "quasi-judicial" licensing
proceedings: during the Eisenhower administration, no "Republican"
newspaper lost a comparative hearing for a television license to a
"Democratic" paper, and no important paper that had supported Eisenhower's opponent, Adlai Stevenson, succeeded in such a proceeding. 45

These examples illustrate that expertise does not enable an

agency to escape the tugs of politics and the need to make value-laden
decisions.
During the past three decades, some scholars have attempted to
justify bureaucratic power by appealing to the political theory of
41 See Sunstein, supra note i5, at 281.

42 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (x969) (quoting the Act of Sept.
14, 1959, § i,

73 Stat. 557, 557 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 315(a))).

After keeping the fairness

doctrine in place for over thirty years, the FCC repealed it in 1987. See In re Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057-58 (1987).
43See ERWIN G. KRASNOW, LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & HERBERT A. TERRY, THE POLITICS
OF BROADCAST REGULATION 20 (3d ed. 1982).
44Id. at 25.
45 See WILLIAM B. RAY, FCC: THE UPS AND DOWNS OF RADIo-TV REGULATION 45 (I99O);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE COMMISSIONS 162-64 (1959).
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pluralistic democracy. 4 6 This theory views the constitutional scheme
as a means of ensuring that political decisions distribute the benefits
of regulation according to the pre-existing values and preferences of
the citizenry. 4 7 The number and specificity of individual interests at
play in the national political arena make it impossible for members
of Congress to assess each constituent's preferences regarding particular legislative choices. Instead, organized interest groups, thought
to reflect voter preferences, guide legislators' behavior.48 Members of
Congress take the political power of interest groups, particularly their
ability to deliver votes at election time, into account when making
49
legislative decisions.
Although interest groups distill individual preferences into a more
manageable set of common interests, this distillation does not fully
enable legislators to assess the desires of their constituents. The diversity of issues that interest groups would like the government to
address and the susceptibility of their interests to rapidly changing
circumstances tax a legislative process notorious for its inefficiency.
Consequently, pluralists believe that regulators should react only to
interest groups that find the status quo sufficiently intolerable to incur
the costs of complaining, and regulators should change policy only as
much as is needed to quell these complaints.5 0 This approach, how46

See, e.g., SAMUEL KRISLOV & DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 24-25 (1981); cf. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND

ITS REFORM 351-52 (1982) (offering interest group representation as a partial, but somewhat
flawed, justification for the power of administrative agencies).
47See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36-38 (1957); SHAPIRO,
supra note 4, at 5-6. Shapiro distinguishes this "public choice," or economic, conception of
pluralism from a more general political science notion, which views competition among interest
groups as the best means of approximating a "public interest" that could conceivably be distinct
from an aggregation of pre-existing private interests. See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 5-7. For
examples of the political science account of pluralistic democracy, see ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 23-24 (1967); and DAVID
B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 512-6 (i95I). The economic version of the theory
dominates the legal literature today. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 45-46
(1984); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 878-83 (1987); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, IS J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975).
43 See WILLIAM A. KELSO, AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 7-10 (1978); TRUMAN, supra
note 47, at 56-57, 61-62.
49See DAHL, supra note 47, at 130-31.
SOFor a more complete description of the incremental mode of setting policy, see Colin S.
Diver, Policymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REv. 393, 401-09 (1981);
and Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 8485 (x959). The close relationship between pluralistic theories of regulatory legitimacy and the
incremental approach to regulation is noted by Martin Shapiro. See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at
32. Pluralistic theory, however, need not rely on the incremental approach; if interest group
pressure for regulatory response entailed a significant minimum investment (as it might given
the cost of procedures for enacting regulatory laws or rules), the political market could be driven
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ever, requires policymakers to maintain a day-to-day awareness of the
regulatory environment, perpetually assess whether interest groups are
satisfied, and constantly consider incremental changes in policy that
might better satisfy all interest groups. Congress, which must address
all controversies throughout society, cannot devote to any one regu5
latory scheme the level of attention that this approach requires. '
Both the size of Congress and constitutional checks and balances
slow legislative action and virtually assure that Congress cannot keep
pace with the often rapid changes in circumstances that help shape
interest groups' immediate political wants.5 2 An interest group can
register its wants more effectively with an agency authorized to regulate a focused set of issues related to the group's interests. 5 3 An
agency not bogged down by the requirement of strict separation of
powers or the need for majority approval by two large bodies of
elected legislators can act more quickly and efficiently than Con54
gress.
Collective choice theorists have identified another problem with
reliance on legislative decisionmaking. They question the ability of a
majority voting scheme to yield stable outcomes in situations involving
realistic assumptions about voters' underlying preferences. 55 Stability
is guaranteed only if a small core of individuals controls the voting
agenda.5 6 The recent weakening of both party control and the committee system in Congress has reduced the control over the legislative
agenda previously exercised by a few powerful committee chairs. This
weakened control makes it less likely that Congress can resolve the
multitude of political controversies affecting powerful interest

far from a stable equilibrium before regulators reacted.

If this occurred, once the regulators

react, they might have to make a fairly significant change in policy to restore the political
market to a new stable equilibrium.
sl See Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 25-26 (1965).
52 See I KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3, at 152 (2d ed. 1978);
Pierce, supra note 29, at 404-05; Stewart, supra note 29, at 331.
53 See L. HARMON ZIEGLER & G. WAYNE PEAK, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
I6I (1972). But cf. JOHN E. CHUBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUCRACY 37-41 (1983)

(arguing that although most interest groups lobby Congress, only the best funded and most
focused attempt to influence policy through participation in costly agency proceedings).
54 See Peter Woll, Introductionto PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY: SELECTED ESSAYS
Robinson,

I, 8-9, 11-12 (Peter Woll ed., x966); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0.

A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56-58 (1982).
5s See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1-8 (195 1); AMARTYA
K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 38-40 (1970).
56 In that case, the stable outcome may not reflect the preference of a majority of the voters.
In some instances, agenda control may even be manipulated to systematically ensure particular
nonmajoritarian outcomes. See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and
Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 564, 588-89 (1977); Richard D. McKelvey, Intransivities
in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implicationsfor Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON.

THEORY 472, 480-81 (2976).
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For these reasons, pluralistic democracy might justify the
bureaucratic state as a more effective means of assessing and fulfilling
the political demands of interest groups.
An example of a regulatory statute that many believe to be a
product of interest group power is the Clean Air Act. 58 Environmentally concerned legislators built a coalition with legislators from eastern
states that produce high sulfur coal to influence the 1977 amendments
to the Act.5 9 The coalition managed to get Congress to adopt language
that could be read to require the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to set an effluent standard for coal burning
power plants that would require plants to install scrubbers, but would
not encourage them to buy cleaner but more expensive western coal. 60
Because the statute's language was unclear, however, the EPA had to
resolve the scrubber question as part of the process of setting the
effluent standard. 6 1 After much wrangling among the various divisions of the EPA staff, the Agency seemed to conclude that a standard
that relied only on scrubbers rather than on burning cleaner coal was
not worth the cost it would impose on the industry, and, in fact,
might have perverse environmental effects. 62 Despite this conclusion,
the EPA adopted a standard that essentially mandated the scrubbing
option, 63 ostensibly because the Administrator believed that one of
the purposes of the 1977 amendments was to promote the use of highsulphur eastern coal. 6 4 At the expense of electricity consumers, the
EPA thereby accommodated the eastern coal interests that had formed
the coalition that helped pass the 1977 amendments.
Like its predecessors, pluralistic democracy theory does not fully
justify the open-ended grants of discretion that characterize the modern bureaucratic state. 65 The ability to deliver votes is the currency
57 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory
of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1246-47 (1989).
58 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1988).

59 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 88 7401-7642 (1988)). For a description of the events surrounding adoption of the 1977
amendments, see Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond The New Deal: Coal and
the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1492-1502 (1980).
6) See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 104(a), 91 Stat. 685, 689
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1988)).
61 See Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 59, at 1502-I.
62 See id. at 1547-50.
63 See id. at 1553-55.
64 See id. at 1503.
65 Moreover, the consistency of pluralistic democracy with our constitutional framework is
highly debatable. Because of imperfections in the political market, there may be groups that
command greater political resources than the resources they would have had if such resources
were directly correlated with the number of people sharing the group's interest and the intensity
with which people favor that interest. See SHAPIRo, supra note 4, at 8-9. Moreover, pluralistic
theory ignores the Federalists' concern with checking the influence of private factions that is
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of pluralistic democracy, but agency members are not directly elected.
Pluralistic democracy must therefore rely on a politically accountable
Congress and President to influence agency action and ensure that the
agency implements the original political "bargain" that prompted the
adoption of the authorizing legislation. Traditionally, Congress constrains agency decisionmaking by sufficiently specifying the parameters
of the bargain in the enabling legislation and relies on non-deferential
judicial review to guard against any unlawful action. But delegation
of lawmaking authority to agencies under a broadly worded statute
gives little direction to agencies or reviewing courts regarding the
precise bounds of the legislative deal. In other words, when Congress
enacts broad enabling legislation, it forfeits the traditional means of
constraining agency action. Therefore, to justify the broad delegation
of lawmaking authority that characterizes the modern administrative
state, pluralistic democracy must find another mechanism to ensure
agency fidelity to the statutory deal struck by special interest groups.
Congress and the President may choose from several mechanisms
to try to keep agency decisions within the bounds of the original
statutory deal. They may monitor agency decisions and give the
agency feedback, either directly by meeting with agency members and
participating in agency proceedings, or indirectly through budget allocations and statutory amendments. 66 Alternatively, they may structure agency decisionmaking processes to give advantages to the interest groups that comprised the coalition responsible for the authorizing
legislation. 67 Both empirical and theoretical analyses, however, demonstrate that these mechanisms do not perform the job pluralistic
theory requires of them.
Empirical studies cast doubt on pluralistic democracy's basic premise that legislators single-mindedly pursue reelection by appeasing special interest groups. Several scholars have concluded that serving
organized interest groups is but one of many factors influencing how
legislators vote. 68 With respect to congressional interaction with agenreflected in the Constitution's system of a representative government with checks and balances.
See EPSTEIN, supra note io, at 126-61.

66 See Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1183,
(i973); Strauss, supra note 4, at 586-95; Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
BureaucraticDiscretionor CongressionalControl? Regulatory Policymakingby the FederalTrade
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 768-69 (1983).
67 See generally Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure
and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 432-35 (i989) (arguing that political control of bureaucratic
agents is best accomplished by an ex ante implementation of administrative procedures rather
than ex post legislation).
68 For a review of empirical studies that test the economic theory of legislation, see Farber
& Frickey, supra note 47, at 895-98 & nn.147-52. Legislators also take into account the interests
of their unorganized constituents, political affiliations, and personal beliefs about what best
serves the public interest. See id. at 900 & n.x65.
1190-91
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cies, evidence suggests that legislators generally do not monitor agency
decisions or attempt to gain electoral support by reacting to them
through the statutory amendment or the budget process. Instead,
legislators appear to garner the support of their constituents by acting
69
as ombudsmen in agency matters concerning constituent interests.
They thereby serve their constituents without having to take a public
stance that may anger other supporters. When Congress as a body
does react to agency decisions or policies, it does not always overrule
those that harm well-organized interest groups. Instead, Congress
usually strikes some new compromise that differs from the understanding that existed before the agency acted, and may even attempt to
overrule or limit agency decisions that favor well-organized special
interest groups. 70 Thus, when Congress does attempt to "modify"
agency action, it does not appear simply to reinstate a preset political
deal struck by special interest groups.
Theoretical considerations reinforce the doubts raised by the empirical studies. If Congress does in fact monitor agency policy, it does
so through the efforts of particular committee members. Agency policy would then depend on the interests of those legislators' constituents
and supporting interest groups, 7 1 which may not be the same as the
groups that forged the coalition responsible for the initial legislative
deal. To illustrate this point further, consider the possible congressional reactions to objectionable agency policy choices: direct participation in agency proceedings by legislators, budget reallocation, and
substantive legislation. These mechanisms involve different internal
legislative dynamics and the influence of different sets of legislators.
It would be merely coincidental if the application of these processes
all resulted in the same political deal that the enabling legislation
originally struck.
Theoretical analysis also suggests that, once the agency acts, Congress and the President may not be able to reinstate the original deal
regardless of the means of correction chosen. Once the agency acts
contrary to the understanding of the original legislative deal, the
agency alters the status quo. This alteration generally will change the
willingness of some members of the majority coalition that enacted
72
the original deal to reinstate the coalition's original understanding.

69 See Pierce, supra note 57, at 1245.
70 Congress's refusal to benefit a well-funded and focused interest group is consistent with
studies that have shown that political ideology is at least as important a factor in legislative
voting as constituent and group interests. See, e.g., Robert A. Bernstein & Stephen R. Horn,
Explaining House Voting on Energy Policy: Ideology and the ConditionalEffects of Party and
District Economic Interests, 34 W. POL. Q. 235, 245 (i98); Judith Goldstein, The Political
Economy of Trade: Institutions of Protection, So AM. POL. Sci. REV. i61, 178-79 (1986).
71 See Weingast & Moran, supra note 66, at 770-75.
72 See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 67, at 435-40.
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Therefore, the greater the latitude given to the agency to make law
consistent with only broad legislative prescriptions, the greater the
likelihood that the regulatory scheme will alter the original legislative
deal. Even if the coalition could agree to overrule the agency and
implement the original deal, it would have to spend much time and
effort monitoring the agency's decisions to ensure compliance - time
and effort legislators might more profitably spend addressing particular constituent complaints and concerns regarding ongoing agency
matters. 73

Some commentators have suggested that the inability of Congress
and the President to monitor and control agency policy-setting directly
leads them to mandate agency procedures that ensure fidelity to the
original substantive deal. These commentators contend that Congress
designs procedures to enable coalition members to monitor agency
action before it becomes effective and to bias agency decisionmaking
toward preferring these members' interests. 74 Thus, Congress does
not need explicitly to monitor or to correct deviant agency decisions.
This argument unrealistically discounts the difficulty of creating
procedural constraints to ensure that agencies implement the legislative deal. First, this use of procedure assumes that there is some
legislative bargain to be implemented. 75 In many instances, however,
it is the inability of the members of the enacting coalition to strike
any bargain that prompts the assignment of the policy decision to the
agency in the first place. Even when Congress does strike a deal,
procedures are unlikely to ensure that an agency will faithfully execute
it. A deal involves a compromise among competing interests. Procedures, however, tend to give advantages to one group over another
rather than to balance interests in order to reproduce the original
compromise.76 Moreover, the groups that are most adept at using
procedures to their advantage are not necessarily those that formed
the legislative coalition. In addition, procedures often have unforeseen
consequences. 77 For example, procedures may give a relative advan-

73See id. at 434; Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. Sci. x65, 168 (1984).
74See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 273-74 (1987); McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 67, at 443-44.
7S See Glen 0. Robinson, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political
Control of Agencies": Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REv. 483, 484-87
(1989).
76 Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 46 (noting that if legislation is a compromise between
special interest groups, then enforcement that favors one interest will not remain faithful to the

statute).
77See Robinson, supra note 75, at 49o.

The controversy over coal-burning power plant

emissions illustrates how agency structure can work against the enacting coalition. Because the
EPA is an executive agency, the Department of Energy (also an executive agency) had a
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tage to groups with more focused interests in regulation, but they also
add costs to agency action. Hence, if the agency action would benefit
focused interest groups, then added procedures would adversely affect
them. 78
Congress would thus take great risks if it tried to use administrative procedures to ensure agency fidelity to a particular substantive
deal. 79 All in all, a less risky course would be for the original coalition
to codify the substantive bargain as precisely as possible.8 0 Delegating
authority in broad terms only increases the chance that the agency
will go astray and does not seem to be an effective way to serve the
special interests of the original coalition.
The controversy over power plant emission standards illustrates
the difficulty of defending broad grants of agency discretion on the
grounds that such discretion ensures outcomes that benefit particular
coalitions of interest groups. Although one might claim that the ultimate EPA decision confirms that agencies serve the interests of
enacting coalitions, the EPA came very close to setting a sulphur
emission standard that would have denied the eastern coal producers
benefits they believed were owed to them under the Act's 1977 amendments. 8 ' Moreover, environmentalists - the other major group in
the coalition - felt that their interests were unduly sacrificed by the
EPA decision. 8 2 If Congress's deal truly was to guarantee that highsulphur coal remained a viable alternative for new power plants, the
statute should have explicitly required the EPA to adopt a scrubbing
requirement, rather than give the EPA discretion over whether to do
so. Stated more generally, even if a statute appears aimed at furthering the interests of a particular coalition, allowing an agency broad
regulatory discretion creates risks that the agency will undermine the
interests of the enacting coalition. If the pluralistic model really mosignificant voice in the process through presidential influence, which allowed the Department to
oppose coal scrubbing at a time when both major interest groups in the enacting coalition eastern coal producers and environmentalists - favored scrubbing. See Ackerman & Hassler,
supra note 59, at 1542-43.

78 See Robinson, supra note 75, at 492-93.
79 There is no evidence that Congress uses statutorily prescribed administrative procedures
to protect substantive legislative bargains. If Congress often did so, one would expect to find
significant variations in such procedures rather than the few archetypes that seem to predominate. See id. at 489-90.
80 See Jeffery S. Hill & James E. Brazier, ConstrainingAdministrative Decisions: A Critical
Examination of the Structure and Process Hypothesis, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373, 374 (.9x).
81 In fact, despite the procedural opportunities for eastern coal interests to "throw their
weight around," it appears that a last minute appeal by Senate Majority Leader Byrd, who not
coincidentally represents the eastern coal-producing state of West Virginia, was instrumental in
.persuading" the EPA Administrator to adopt an implicit scrubbing requirement. See Ackerman
& Hassler, supra note 59, at 1552-54.
82Of the affected interest groups, only the environmentalists and power companies challenged
the EPA standards in court. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 312-13 (D.C. Cir. i981).
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tivated most regulation, one would expect regulatory statutes to contain much more detailed provisions limiting agencies' abilities to deviate from legislatively struck deals.
The prior discussion is not meant to show that previously advanced
theories of agency decisionmaking provide no justification for some of
the policy-setting discretion that characterizes the administrative state.
It merely demonstrates that they do not explain, let alone justify,
many legislative delegations of decisionmaking authority to the bureaucracy. I simply contend that civic republicanism provides a more
coherent theoretical foundation for the bureaucratic state.

II. CIVIc REPUBLICANISM -

ITS PROMISES AND ITS PITFALLS

A. Civic Republicanism Defined
Civic republicanism has evolved as a concurrence of liberal and
republican theory that simultaneously seeks to foster individual freedom from government-imposed values and freedom collectively to
define the values of the relevant political community.8 3 According to
civic republicanism, the state acts legitimately only if it furthers the
"common good" of the political community.8 4 Unlike more traditional
republican theories, civic republicanism neither posits some external
conception of the common good nor relies on some elite body to define
it. Instead, civic republicanism embraces an ongoing deliberative
process, inclusive of all cultures, values, needs, and interests, to arrive
at the public good.ss Civic republicans see the development of a
conception of the common good as a fundamental purpose of democracy - a purpose necessary for individual self-identity and self-ful-

fillment.8 6
Civic republicanism also posits that no individual acting in her
87
political capacity should be subservient to other political actors.
Hence, the theory does not equate the public good that legitimates
government action with majority rule. Social consensus about what

8 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1566-71.
84 See Ackerman, supra note io, at 1o2o; Michelman, supra note io, at 18-ig; Sunstein,
supra note 12, at 1547-48; Reich, supra, note 13, at 1631-32.
85
IT]he common ground can be located in an understanding of every person as thoroughly
conditioned by a shared social context that helps constitute that person's identity. This
social context consists not only of networks of personal relationship but also, more
fundamentally, of language, culture, and their influence on how we perceive the world.
Michelman, supra note io, at 32.
86 See id. at 18-ig.
87 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at i55o.
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is best for the community as a community,8 8 not as the aggregation
of individuals' private interests, is the defining feature of the common
good. 8 9 Government's political decisions - that is, the law - must
embody this consensus of the common good.
Civic republicanism does not ignore individuals' private interests
or the culturally and historically defined values from which these
interests derive. 90 It does, however, encourage people to understand
and empathize with others whose values reflect different experiences
and cultural backgrounds. 9 1 It assumes that the deliberative process,
if properly structured, will transform these values and ultimately reveal commonalities shared by different citizens. It is this transformative power of politics that enables the polity to reach consensus
about the common good. 92 Through the transformative power of
politics, citizens are able to define the community norms that restrict

the behavior of all community members, yet that all accept as just.
The ideals of civic republican theory translate into general operative criteria that good government must satisfy. First and foremost,
the demand for deliberative government means that before the government acts, it must engage in public discourse about whether the
action will further the common good. 93 Public debate and discussion
foster widespread awareness of other citizens' views of the public
ss See id. at 1550; cf. Michael J. Sandel, Justice and the Good, in LIBERALISM AND ITS
CRITICS I59, 167 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) (describing a community as embodied in the
participants' institutions and distinct from their plans of life).
89 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1548, 1554-55. Thus, civic republican deliberation to
achieve consensus differs from negotiation to reach an outcome acceptable to all. Negotiation
implicitly assumes a trade-off of private interests to arrive at a compromise. Deliberation
involves an ongoing attempt at persuasion that has the potential to alter how all participants
view the contested subjects of debate. See Michelman, supra note ii, at 1512-13; Sunstein,
supra note 12, at 1549.
Civic republicanism does not assert that a political community can achieve consensus at
every level on every issue. The costs of deliberation make this both impossible and unwise.
See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 38 (1983). Sometimes compromises will represent the best
resolution of an issue because of barriers to universal consensus. See Sunstein, supra note 12,
at 1555. Still, within a civic republican framework, the process of deliberation increases understanding of the positions of others and thereby facilitates outcomes that are accepted as closer
to the ideal and hence more democratic and just. See infra pp. I534-35, 1539.
90 In practical terms, it is probably impossible to envision discourse about public values that
is "external to private beliefs and values." Sunstein, supra note i2, at 1549.
91 Cf. id. at i55o ("The requirement of deliberation is designed to ensure that political
outcomes will be supported by reference to a consensus (or at least broad agreement) among
political equals.").
92 See Michelman, supra note ii,

at 1505-o6, 1512-I5; Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1549.

The reliance on the transformative capacity of political deliberation aligns civic republican
theory with the philosophy of Jurgen Habermas, who has asserted that "practical discourse" an ideal speech situation - provides the means of validating normative claims through revelation
of generalizable interests. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTMISM AND RELATIVISM
187 (1983).

93 See ELSTER, supra note 89, at 35; Sunstein, supra note I,

at 282.
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interest and thereby facilitate consensus. Deliberative government
also requires that the decisionmaker, be it the President, legislature,
judge, or agency, explain how its decisions further the common
good. 94 This requirement guards against political "deals" that advance
the private interests of particular factions within society. 95 Explanation by the decisionmaker also promotes understanding of how government action relates to the common good and thus encourages acceptance of that action.
The civic republican goal that government policy reflect political
consensus requires open access to the policymaking process. 96 Representatives of all interests potentially affected by a government action
must have meaningful opportunities to engage in discussion about the
action. 97 Feedback from the decisionmakers to the people is equally
important; it allows the decisionmaking process to influence individual
value formation. Broad rights of access serve both of these requirements. They allow champions of particular values to communicate
their perspectives to government decisionmakers, and they facilitate
the decisionmakers' communication of the reasons for their decision
-

how their decision takes account of various perspectives -

to the

citizenry.
Interest groups may be essential, if civic republicanism is to
achieve its ideal of political access and input, because they consolidate
people with common private interests and backgrounds. Interest
groups streamline the input that the government receives but ensure
that the interests of diverse parties are represented. Interest group
representatives can, in turn, provide feedback to group members
94 Thus, Martin Shapiro has characterized the courts' recent call for more complete and
persuasive explanation of rulemaking decisions as a conversion of administrative law from a

pluralist to deliberative basis. See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at i68. And, although not explicitly
invoking republican thought, Gerald Gunther's call for more meaningful rationality review of

legislation, tying review to the actual motivation of the legislature, essentially applies this criteria
of deliberation to the legislative process. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court,

-

1971

Term

Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal

Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 21 (1972).
95 See ELSTER, supra note 89, at 35-36; cf. Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections
on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. I99, 2o6-17 (discussing
cases in which agency decisions were reversed and remanded for a failure to state adequate
reasons for the decisions).
96 Access also serves the republican commitment to citizenship, which emphasizes individual
participation in the process of defining self and community. See Paul Brest, Further Beyond
the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623-24 (1988);
Hannah F. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 347-49 (1981).
97 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 212-14. If universality is to be achieved, the only

alternative to access is the exclusion of those individuals whose values differ from the political
community. This was the route taken by many traditional republicans and arguably by the
Federalists, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 249-52, 324-25 (1935), but one rejected by present-day advocates of
civic republicanism, see Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1569.
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about how the government's ultimate decision addresses their particular concerns. Although interest groups are not currently organized
primarily to provide such give-and-take between group members and
leaders, intra-group communications can influence members' frameworks for understanding and evaluating government action.
It may seem paradoxical that civic republicanism, which eschews
the primacy of private interests in favor of a common good, must rely
on groups organized around private interests. 98 In fact, however,
citizen participation in an interest group, and in the definition of the
group's values and goals, can provide an outlet for participatory rather
than representative community self-determination. 99 In other words,
the tension between republican citizenship and the Madisonian notion
of representative government is not so great if one views the formation
and identification of "private" interest groups - groups that may
include churches, labor unions, civic associations, and even corporations and local governments - as part of the deliberative process.
There is no inconsistency as long as the political role of interest groups
is to debate the common good from their unique perspectives, and
not intransigently to pursue their private concerns. 100
The civic republican condition that political participants not be
subservient to one another mandates that government decisionmakers
have equal regard for all interests. 101 No private preference is a priori
illegitimate; a private interest may be deemed illegitimate only if the
deliberative process reveals it to be inconsistent with universally
shared norms of ethics or justice. Decisionmakers should evaluate the
positions of participants in the political process by the persuasiveness
of their arguments and not by the identity, status, or number of
individuals supporting each position. 10 2 It is not enough that a decision garners popular support or that it accurately reflects a political
bargain that furthers the private interests of a majority of citizens; to
be legitimate, a decision must respect the positions of all interest
9s Cf. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1573-74 (noting the potential of private "intermediate
organizations" for encouraging citizenship, but also noting the dangers posed if such organizations
are not themselves subject to constraints).
99 See PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 34-38 (1964); Robert H.
Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. x, 16 (1969). A

theory of civic republicanism that allows organized participation in national government through
interest groups begins to respond to Paul Brest's critique that civic republicanism fails to
sufficiently involve the citizen in government. See Brest, supra note 96, at x625-26.
100 But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1721 (1988)
(arguing that private voluntary associations are "too homogeneous, too partial, [and] too differentiated" to form the groundwork for a civic republican system).
101 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1552-53. Frank Michelman suggests that civic republicanism's "dialogic, critical-transformative dimension" cannot even take place without the stimulation of nonmalnstream views by those at the margins of society. Michelman, supra note II,
at 1529-30.
102 See ELSTER, supra note 89, at 35-36.
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groups and respond to their arguments in terms of the good of the
community.
These operative criteria do not necessarily invalidate compromises
among different interest groups. In some situations, compromises
might serve the common good.' 0 3 For example, although most religious groups feel strongly that their beliefs are correct, the common
interest may be best served by an agreement to tolerate all religions
and to demand that the government not prefer some over others.104
In the bailiwick of more traditional regulation, the pricing of natural
monopoly goods, such as utility service, may be best accomplished by
a political determination of the fair share that each class of customers
should contribute to fixed costs - a deal splitting the costs over and
above marginal cost.105 In other words, civic republicanism does not
condemn all government decisions that explicitly divide benefits between interest groups; rather, it condemns those deals reached by
groups that barter with the currency of electoral power to further prepolitical private interests.
Although civic republicanism makes optimistic assumptions about
the government's capacity to act deliberatively, it recognizes that the
natural tendency of human beings, at least in large measure, is to act
in their self-interest. 10 6 It therefore calls for institutional structures to

103 For example, the achievement of a consensus about a particular government decision
may be impractical or so expensive that achieving consensus is not in the public interest. In
such a case, the public interest might best be served by a consensus on a meta-principle that a
compromise is appropriate. For further discussion of compromise as part of deliberative politics,
see ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 213-14 (1984); and STEPHEN K. WHITE, THE RECENT

WORK OF JURGEN HABERMAS 75-77 (1988).
104 Sunstein has stated that civic republicanism is not opposed to rights and has asserted
that "religion . . . should be entirely off-limits to politics." Sunstein, supra note i2, at 1555. I
agree with this view if Sunstein means to assert more precisely that he perceives a nearly
universal consensus that such matters should be left to individuals as a matter of private right
or that there is consensus that discourse will never resolve actual religious questions and hence
will be unjustifiably costly and fractious. See id. at 1555 n.85; Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or
the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 19, 49 (Jon Elster & Rune
Slagstad eds., 1988). In addition, civic republican theory may permit a notion of rights as a
sphere of freedom from government intervention that is presupposed by the deliberative process
- a sphere that frees citizens to develop their capacities to engage in the critical dialogic process
of defining their communities. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the
Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 337-44 (1982). This sphere
might include religion.
1o5 As long as no particular class of customers exhibits significant elasticity of demand, there
is no economic basis for apportioning these fixed costs. There may, however, be other bases,
such as the relative wealth of classes of customers or a desire to redistribute wealth more
equitably. See i ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 144-46 (1970).
16 See Sunstein, supra note io, at 49; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., i961) ("As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a
certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature,
which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.").
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ensure against regulations meant merely to serve particular factions'
private interests. 10 7 Limiting factional influence was the rationale
given by the Federalists for the separation of powers, a bicameral
legislature, indirect election of the President and the Senate, and the
dual system of state and federal government.' 0 8 These structural
safeguards, however, frequently have proven unable to prevent regulators from acting in a pluralistic rather than in a civic republican
fashion. The question remains how best to structure government to
achieve the civic republican ideal, and this, in turn, depends on
understanding the potential benefits and detriments of civic republican
theory and how they might be realized or avoided.
B. The Promise of Civic Republicanism
The appeal of civic republicanism derives both from the richness
of the role it defines for citizens - to determine the identity of their
political community - and from its explicit attempt to counter factional competition. Pluralism accepts factionalism as a given and
defines the public interest as an aggregation of private values.1 09 By
doing so, pluralism denies the importance of community and thereby
precludes many regulatory outcomes that might prove fulfilling to the
entire populace in the long run. In fact, pluralistic democracy reveres
the pursuit of private interest, for to enhance individual private interest is to enhance the aggregate of such interests. n o Pluralistic
democracy therefore considers debate about the legitimacy of the values enhanced by government action unnecessary as long as those
values accurately reflect the bargain struck by interest groups participating in a "fair" democratic process.' 1 ' Thus, under pluralistic democracy, the state may actually end up pursuing values that the
political community, after deliberation, would universally consider
repugnant." 2 At best, by cordoning off discussion about the legiti-

107 See Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. i651, I652 (1988).
103 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 5i, at 320-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
196I); THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 345 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
109 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1543; see also Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism
Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1639 (1988) (describing pluralism as
accepting that "there is no collective way to define what constitutes the good life").
0
11
See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMaOCRACY 187-88 (1987); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 421 (Edwin Carran ed., 1937).
M See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1542-43.
112 See id. at 1543-44. "Bad preferences," to use Sunstein's terminology, might result from
a victimized group's adapting its preferences to available opportunities. See ELSTER, supra note
89, at IO9-I . They might also occur if beneficiaries of existing practices alter their beliefs to
reduce "cognitive dissonance" between their conduct and their moral values. See George A.
Akerloff & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 307, 308-09 (1982).
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macy of values, pluralistic democracy implicitly lends legitimacy to
existing mainstream values, which not surprisingly mirror those of the
historically dominant culture. 113 In contrast, by insisting that government actions reflect social consensus about the common good, civic
republicanism facilitates the adoption of law that respects the interests
of minorities and other groups historically excluded from political
power" 4 and that simultaneously comports with the polity's general
sense of justice. This facilitation, however, can occur only if the
decisionmaking process includes representatives of groups normally
excluded from the political process or so frustrated by it that they
have become apathetic or even alienated.
Regulating by deliberate decisionmaking also enriches the polity's
choice of values by expanding the impoverished subset of governmental choices made available by pluralistic democracy. Not only may
regulation correct imperfections in the market's ordering of private
preferences, it may also legitimately embody the community's collective desires. Participation in the political process of defining those
collective desires enables individuals to attain a sense of both selffulfillment and community identification." 5 The law may satisfy citizens' altruistic preferences, which often conflict with their immediate,
self-interested desires. It may also allow the realization of secondorder preferences "wishes about wishes" - such as protecting
cultural diversity or ensuring economic equality. Finally, civic republican law may precommit individuals to a course of conduct that each
considers to be in his best interest, but from which he fears he will
6
deviate if left to his own devices."
In addition to legitimizing an expAnsive role for government regulation, discourse can enlighten participants about potential community norms. Such education might foster creativity, leading participants to construct regulatory schemes that they would not have
considered had the political process aimed at coalition-building and
compromise rather than community consensus.1 1 7 In sum, identifi-

113 This is the political analogy to a critique of the economic principle of pareto optimality
- that it takes the initial distribution of wealth as given even though the initial distribution
greatly affects the final economic state. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 39; John T. Donohue
III, Law and Economics: The Road Not Taken, 22 LAv & Soc'Y REV. 903, 906-o8 (I988).
114 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1575-76. In this regard, modern civic republicanism
departs quite drastically from its traditional republican roots. The tendency of republican theory
to exclude those outside the mainstream culture has led some commentators to question whether
particular processes of deliberative government can effectively include the voices of minorities
and the disadvantaged. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racist
Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 16o9, 1612-13 (1988); Fitts, supra note 107, at 166o-61; Linda K. Kerber,
Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1669 (1988).

11s See ROBERT P. WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 190-93 (1968).
116 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 59.
117 See Reich, supra note 13, at 1636.
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cation of the community as a distinct entity that influences the selfdefinition of its members encourages the government to adopt a supportive role that can enhance individual feelings of happiness and selfworth.11 8 Some commentators have even suggested that participation
in determining the identity of the political community is itself a good,
thereby rendering civic republicanism inherently as well as instrumentally valuable.11 9
Civic republicanism also promises to minimize distortions in the
democratic process. In the pluralist world of competing factions,
elected officials are supposed to constrain regulators to set policy in
accordance with the number of people who support the policy and
the intensity of their support. 120 Unfortunately, the magnitude and
intensity of citizen views regarding all but the most salient regulatory
controversies have relatively little effect on elections. Instead, the
aggregate wealth of interest groups, the power and status of their
members, and the existing political power of incumbents greatly distort electoral outcomes. 121
Even if the democratic process started out undistorted, it most
likely would not stay that way. Without a "public interest" constraint,
legislatures have incentives to create and distribute "monopoly
rents" 122 to interest groups that support incumbents. These incentives
enhance the wealth and power of interest groups, create economic
disparities that allow "reinvestment" in incumbent reelection, and
make reelection more likely. 123 Public choice theorists bemoan un1S See id. at 1637.
119

See Brest, supra note 96, at 624; Pitkin, supra note 96, at 344-45.

120 See HELD, supra note iO,

at

192-95.

This realization has sparked great concern about the influence of political action committees and the fact that the success rate for United States Representatives who seek reelection
121

is between ninety and ninety-eight percent. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM 185 (3d ed. 1984); MORRIS P. FIORINA,
CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 116 (2d ed. 1989). Interestingly,

concerns about unequal influence due to wealth and privilege were recently expressed by Robert
Dahl, perhaps the preeminent trumpeter of pluralistic democracy. See ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 54-55 (1985).
122 1 use the term "monopoly rents" in a limited sense to refer to the excess profits that
entities in economic markets can earn because the government has legally restricted or biased
the workings of these markets. See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 8-11 (James M. Buchanan, Robert D.
Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 198o); George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
123 See James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of
Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3, 19-20
(James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer J.
Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6
J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 67, 169-7o (i99o). But cf. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation,
in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 357-63 (James Q. Wilson ed., i98o) (arguing that the

rent seeking theory does not accurately describe much of regulatory politics).
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constrained congressional power precisely because they fear that the
motive to create monopoly rents is so powerful and pervasive that it
necessarily renders the legislative process a socially wasteful contest
for such rents. 124 In sum, pluralism invariably produces political
distortions that serve to perpetuate existing bases of economic and
political power. Civic republicanism attempts to overcome this systematic bias by requiring the state to justify its decisions in terms
other than the promotion of interests of politically influential factions.
C. The PotentialPitfalls of Civic Republicanism
Because civic republican theory envisions a broader array of government activity than a theory that credits only the pursuit of private
wants, 125 the theory also creates a potential for abuse that some fear
may be worse than the factionalism that it tries to alleviate.1 26 First,
civic republicanism may facilitate the pursuit of private ends by the
politically powerful. Second, it may grant the state substantial latitude to impose on the populace what is in fact an inaccurate conception of the common good.
Fears that civic republicanism may increase enforcement of private-interest deals stem from the belief that there is no common good
apart from the aggregate of individuals' private preferences. 12 7 The
civic republican response draws upon the intuition that if one asks
individuals what is good for society and what is good for them personally, one will usually get different answers. 128 Individuals arrive
at conceptions of the public interest in part by imagining what it
would be like to be in the shoes of others - by empathizing with the
problems and aspirations of citizens from different backgrounds who
have different needs and wants. Each individual has some subjective
124 The creation of monopoly rents, in the political context, is inefficient because those who
are outside the beneficiary group pay more in competition costs, increased prices, and taxes
than the successful interest group realizes in extra profits. See Anne 0. Krueger, The Political

Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 301-02 (1974); Gordon Tullock,
Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY,
supra note 122, at 17, 19-31.

12s See supra notes IX5-1i6 and accompanying text.
126 According to Jonathan Macey:
Two of the most salient lessons of history are the mixed success of governmental efforts
to do good on the one hand and the awesome success of the government when it turns
its hand to hatred and destruction on the other. It is in light of these intractable lessons
that Sunstein's reliance on civic virtue assumes an ominous dimension.
Jonathan R. Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673, 1684

(1988) (footnotes omitted).
127 See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 8, at 1I-IS, 284-85; Don Herzog, Some
Questionsfor Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473, 476-77 (1986).

12 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 155o (arguing that the republican requirement of civic
virtue "refers simply to the understanding that in their capacity as political actors, citizens and
representatives are not supposed to ask only what is in their private interest, but also what will
best serve the community in general").
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notion of the common good - a notion that embodies public values
shared with others in the community.12 9 Civic republicanism requires
that the government base its actions on these public values rather
than on the private desires that citizens bring into political discourse. 13 0

Another criticism that raises the specter of private dealmaking
asserts that even if a common good does exist, individuals will inevitably pursue their self-interest. 13 1 This inevitability suggests that the
operative elements of civic republicanism - discussion and debate,
access, and substantive checks by independent institutions against the
pursuit of self-interest - will not preclude politically powerful groups
from cutting deals to serve their separate interests. The current failure
of checks and balances in the federal government to constrain factional
politics gives credence to this concern. Deliberation, however, should
not simply be dismissed as an ineffective moderating influence on
factional conduct.
In many instances, people do not recognize that their political
positions stem from personal experiences and values. They may not
be aware of other conceptions of the public interest or understand
132
how their conception would affect those who differ from them.
They may also "delude" themselves into thinking that the values that
33
guide their self-interested behavior accord with the public interest.1
By informing citizens about others' conceptions of the public interest
and by revealing to them how their own conceptions might harm
others, the deliberative process can help educate citizens and unmask
self-delusions. 134 In addition, requiring explanation of government

129 The civic republican notion of the common good stems from what Michael Sandel terms
"a commonality of shared self-understanding." SANDEL, supra note io, at 182. Even political
economists such as James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock concede that individuals do entertain
subjective conceptions of the public good, although they deny that these conceptions can provide
the basis for a more universal notion of the public interest except by the imposition of one
individual's conception of the public interest on another. See BUcHANAN & TULLOCK, supra
note 8, at 284.
130 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1554-55.
131 See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 8, at 27-28; Epstein, supra note iog, at
1637-39; Macey, supra note 126, at 1678-79.
132 See ELSTER, supra note 89, at 112-13.
133 People "tend ... to see their own behavioral choices and judgments as relatively common
and appropriate to existing circumstances while viewing alternative responses as uncommon,
deviant, or inappropriate." Lee Ross, David Greene & Pamela House, The "False Consensus
Effect": An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXPERINIENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 279, 280 (1977).
134 See ELSTER, supra note 89, at 36-37. To the extent that the lack of a universally
acceptable conception of the public interest stems from various interest groups' attributing a
false consensus to their own values, the deliberative process has the potential to correct this
mistaken attribution by making individuals' "sampling and retrieval of evidence" more accurate
and by counteracting through discussion their "idiosyncratic interpretation of situational factors
and forces." Ross, Greene & House, supra note 133, at 299.
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decisions will sometimes prevent decisionmakers from crediting raw
political power. Some political deals simply cannot be justified persuasively in principled terms.135 At least at the margin, the prospect
of an independent review to ensure reasoned decisionmaking will deter
interest groups from striking deals. 136 Finally, if courts seriously required an agency to explain why a change in policy better serves the
public interest than does the status quo, regulators would hesitate to
give post hoc rationalizations for unprincipled political decisions. The
agency's past explanations of its policies would frame the debate about
present controversies; the whole vocabulary for the discussion of a
policy choice would depend on principles announced in previous decisions. An agency that provided reasons truly unrelated to the actual
basis for a decision might find itself hamstrung by a policy that it
never wanted to adopt.
In short, the human propensity to pursue self-interest is not fatal
to civic republican theory. Civic republicanism explicitly recognizes
this propensity and responds by demanding institutional constraints
that discourage such pursuits. Instead of undermining the call for a
civic republican political norm, the strong tendency to act in one's
self-interest highlights the need for such a norm. The suggested alternative - constraining government to limit the influence of humanity's evil tendencies - provides no answer to those without the means
to compete in a society of purely private transactions 137 or to those
who see their identity as bound with that of their community.
Even if government pursues what it perceives to be the common
good, one might fear that the state will impose a mistaken conception
of that good, especially if one doubts the citizenry's ability to achieve
135 An example of which I have personal knowledge involved a New York State Public
Service Commission (PSC) decision that allocated a tax refund between a utility and its ratepayers. The refund stemmed from statutorily sanctioned changes in the utility's operations in
the wake of damage to one of its power plants from a rock slide on the Niagara River. The
PSC reasoned that the slide had caused utility customers to pay higher rates and had cut into
shareholder profits. Without evaluating these losses precisely, the Commission decided to split
the refund equally between shareholders and ratepayers. The state's intermediate appellate
court remanded the decision on the grounds that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and
capricious: because both parties to the suit had presented detailed evidence on the question of
loss, the Commission was duty-bound to allocate the refund in accordance with the evidence in
the record. See Niagara Mohawk Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 476 N.Y.S.2d 396, 400
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984). To the amazement of many in the PSC's Office of Counsel, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed and upheld the PSC decision. Because it granted such broad
discretion to the PSC to balance the equities, the court effectively relieved the Commission of
any meaningful requirement to explain its decision based on the record. See Niagara Mohawk
Power Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 485 N.E.2d 233, 236 (N.Y. 1985).
136 Other students of administrative decisionmaking, however, believe that the explanation
requirement is unhelpful. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Enrichment Series: The (Unhappy) Truth
About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239, 239 (I973).
137 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 737-38 (1964).
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consensus about the public interest. 13 8 Certainly such doubts have
foundation: one should not expect a consistent set of answers from
different individuals who are asked whether a specific government
program furthers the common good. In the absence of consensus,
government might allow officials to mask imposition of the mainstream culture's values on the rest of the populace. Worse yet, a
regulator might impose her personal conception of the common good
39
as the law. 1

The hope of civic republicanism, however, is that deliberation
about a more abstract level of principles will yield consensus. Particular governmental decisions then can, and to be legitimate, must,
conform to these principles. 140 Although appeal to meta-principles
may facilitate agreement, I am skeptical that society can ever reach
a universal consensus about them. The process of deliberation, however, frequently enables society to come close, in the sense of arriving
at a set of principles to which most citizens would agree. 141 Moreover,
civic republicanism's explicit call for persuasion of others as the goal
of the deliberative process is likely to discourage adoption of egregiously coercive principles. 142 Any coercion that then results is likely
to be more just and democratic (that is, it will come closer to conforming to the public values of a greater proportion of the citizenry)
than the coercion that may accompany a system of factionalism and
political barter. The potential for coercion, however, cannot be ignored: any system established to implement a civic republican democracy will be somewhat coercive. 14 3 One must therefore take care to
135 See ZIEGLER & PEAK, supra note 53, at 21-23; Herzog, supra note 127, at 488-89; see
also Iris M. Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 254-55 (1989) (noting that early American republicans used the myth of
a universally shared perspective to exclude those outside the dominant culture from political
participation).
139See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators:
Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in PoliticalInstitutions, 33 J.L. & ECON. 103, 103-04 (1990);
Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics,
74 AM. ECON. REv. 279, 298 (1984) [hereinafter Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology].
140 For example, Michelman's republican critique of the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. I86 (1986), stems from an assertion that although there is no consensus
on the morality of homosexuality itself, there is a shared understanding that "homosexuality has
come to signify not just a certain sort of inclination that 'anyone' might feel, but a more
personally constitutive and distinctive way, or ways, of being." Michelman, supra note ix, at
1533. Hence, to be legitimate, government decisions regarding homosexuality must be consistent
with this shared understanding.
141Cf. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1555 ("The republican position is not that every issue is
subject to political resolution; it is instead that some questions can yield general agreement
through deliberation. A conception of politics that disregards this fact will be doomed to repeat
the failings of pluralism.").
142 See Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338,
357-59 (Elly Stein & Jayne Mansbridge trans., 1987).
143 Coercion, however, is inherent in any system of binding law. Even full participatory

1540

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1511

set up a decisionmaking process that minimizes the potential for coercion.
One might also distrust the leeway that civic republican theory
grants the state because the state's adoption of a particular conception
of the public good will not necessarily lead to unique legal or policy
outcomes.1 44 Non-unique outcomes, however, do not necessarily condemn civic republican theory. In fact, majoritarian voting schemes
145
upon which pluralist theory relies suffer from the same defect.
Civic republicanism does not require that the common good ultimately
determine every state action. It remains a useful model of government
as long as pursuit of the common good places constraints on decisionmakers that lead them to reach more just and acceptable outcomes
than would result under other theories. The hope is that choosing
policy to comport with basic values derived through deliberation will
reduce disagreements that stem from fundamental value inconsistencies.
Finally, critics of civic republicanism object that its insulation of
decisionmakers from immediate political pressure leads to undemocratic outcomes. 146 By disdaining direct electoral checks, the theory
gives policymakers little incentive to discover deliberatively determined community values or to examine how the values bear on the
issues before them. This disdain might lead to either of the two
dangerous pitfalls of civic republicanism: government that serves powerful private interest groups or government that implements regulators'
47
personal conceptions of the common good.1
This criticism highlights a fundamental tension in civic republican
theory. The theory relies on the citizenry to define community values,

democracy with a rule of unanimity is coercive, because the failure to act is equivalent to
deciding to maintain the status quo, a decision with which some may disagree.
144 See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 2; Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97
YALE L.J. I685, 1698-99 (1988).
145 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS 141 (1989); Pierce, supra note 57, at
1251. In addition to the critiques addressed in the text, some scholars have expressed practical
concerns about the costs of civic republicanism's deliberative goal. See SHAPIRO, supra note 4,

at 29-3o; Diver, supra note 5o, at 428. One quick response is that civic republican deliberation
takes into account the cost of discourse on particular issues. In other words, a regulator could
legitimately stop an inquiry if she reasonably suspected that further inquiry would be costly
and unlikely to alter significantly her preliminary policy determination. At a more visceral
level, however, I still feel uneasy about any theory that requires a search for the best policy.

To me, civic republicanism becomes more attractive if viewed not as demanding perfection, but
instead as requiring that outcomes be acceptable to all after the deliberative process occurs a view premised on some variation of "incremental" decisionmaking and "satisficing." Cf.
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 204-05, 241-73 (1957) (postulating that individuals
within organizations "satisfice"); Diver, supra note 5o, at 399-400 (describing incremental decisionmaking).
147 See Diver, supra note 5o, at 428-29.
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but distrusts the citizenry's willingness to pursue the public good.
Civic republicanism demands that the law simultaneously conform
with a popular consensus and yet not represent a mere polling of
people's private preferences. In operative terms, one cannot subject
decisionmakers to more direct political pressure without threatening
the civic republican ideal that decisionmakers act deliberatively.
To resolve this tension, a civic republican decisionmaking process
must explicitly choose the level of political influence that best balances
the requirement of deliberation against that of popularly supported
outcomes. 148 This choice should depend on the attendant circumstances and the political ethic at the time the process is established.
Thus, although a system of constitutional checks and balances seemed
adequate to ensure congressional deliberation when the Constitution
was ratified, those checks and balances may not sufficiently constrain
factional influence today. 149 Given such politically influential institutions as the modern press, large corporations, and private interest
groups that closely monitor government decisions, the problem today
is not a lack of responsiveness to popular interests, but rather an
overresponsiveness to immediate and fickle political whims and to
powerful factions that exercise undue influence over electoral politics.
The problem is not that government will act without regard for the
preferences of the politically enfranchised, but rather that the procedural balance has tipped too heavily toward political influence and
away from deliberation by decisionmakers.

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE AS A MEANS OF FULFILLING
-THE CIVIC REPUBLICAN
PROMISE

Administrative agencies - the so-called fourth branch of government - may be the only institutions capable of fulfilling the civic
republican ideal of deliberative decisionmaking. Congress adheres
primarily to pluralistic norms and responds most directly to factional
influence. Although one proponent of civic republicanism, Cass Sunstein, has sought to revitalize Congress's deliberative processes through
more active judicial review,15 0 the size, structure, and historicallyrooted decisionmaking procedures of Congress render the prospect of
revitalization unlikely. Perhaps for this reason, another proponent of

143This is a corollary of the more general point that drawing the line between majoritarian
rule and minority rights is always a political (value-laden) choice. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. io63, xo96-i05 (i981); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town:
The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1o6o-62
(198o).
149 See Sunstein, supra note io, at 48-49.
150 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 164; Sunstein, supra note io, at 72.
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civic republicanism, Frank Michelman, has called upon the judiciary
to define directly the values that underlie governmental policy and are
embodied in law. 151 Courts, however, are too far removed from the
voice of the citizenry, and judges' backgrounds are too homogenous
and distinct from those of many Americans to ensure that judiciallydefined policy will accord with the public values of the polity.
Administrative agencies, however, fall between the extremes of the
politically over-responsive Congress and the over-insulated courts.
Agencies are therefore prime candidates to institute a civic republican
model of policymaking. Some recent administrative resolutions of
tough policy choices illustrate the role that agencies can play. For
example, although the American public, experts, and government
officials all agreed that the United States should close some military
bases, Congress was unable to close any, or even set the criteria for
deciding which bases should be closed. Too many representatives
found the prospect of a base closing in their district politically unacceptable. A special commission, however, was able to order base
closings and do so in a fashion that took into account efficiency
concerns, the need for national defense, and the economic dislocations
152
in areas where bases will close.
I believe that the success achieved by the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission was not an anomaly. The place of
administrative agencies in government - subordinate and responsible
to Congress, the courts, and the President - allows for the checks
on agency decisionmaking that ensure politically informed discourse
and prevent purely politically-driven outcomes. The bureaucratic
structure of administrative agencies and the processes by which they
frequently decide questions of policy also foster deliberative government.153 Consequently, as the remainder of this section outlines, the
administrative state holds greater promise for a "civic republican res151 See Michelman, supra note io, at 66-73; Michelman, supra note ii,

at 1537; see also

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986) (suggesting that law represents judges' interpretations of the community's "coherent conception of justice and fairness").
152 See Gwen Ifill, Public Debate on Base Closing Disorients Capital's Power Brokers, N.Y.
TIMlES, June 23, I99I, at Ai8; cf. Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917, 953 n.121 (1990)

(noting the success of the Base Closing Commission but implying that-the success may have
resulted from the somewhat closed nature of the Commission proceedings).
153

Administrators at least operate within a set of legal rules (administrative law) that keep
them within their jurisdiction, require them to operate with a modicum of explanation
and participation of the affected interests, police them for consistency, and protect them
from the importuning of congressmen and others who would like to carry logrolling into

the administrative process.
Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 8I, 99 (1985).
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olution" to many questions of policy than either the judicial or legislative alternatives.
A. The Place of Administrative Agencies
in American Government
z. Availability of Judicial Review to Ensure Deliberative Decisionmaking. - Although the legitimacy of the judiciary stems from
its use of reasoned decisionmaking,15 4 courts are ill-equipped to delineate the public values that flow from political deliberation. Federal
judges are not politically accountable. Although political independence frees them from the pressures that encourage interest group
accommodation, it also accords them great latitude to impose their
subjective conceptions of the public interest on the nation. 15 5 Courts
have neither the motivation nor the means to obtain information about
the values of the general polity, on which civic republicanism's common good depends. 156 The federal courts are also necessarily reactive
- they can legitimately decide only the issues brought before them
15 7
by litigants and therefore cannot establish a policy-setting agenda.
Courts might provide, at best, only a partial delineation of the public
values and policies necessary to implement civic republican theory.
Furthermore, the courtroom is not a forum designed to develop a
consensus about the public good. Procedural formality makes participation in the judicial process expensive.1 58 Judicial proceedings are
154

See ALEXANDER M.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 24-27 (1962); HERBERT

WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 27-28 (1961).
155 See RABKIN, supra note 146, at 141-42; SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 121-23.

This might
be defensible if the judiciary mirrored the American population, but the demographics and
attitudes of federal judges do not come close to representing a cross-section of American society.
See Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 669-70 (1985).
156 See THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF THE COURTS, THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 89, 92-93, 99 (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., 1984). Courts lack the motivation to do so
because they are not electorally accountable and because they tend to view their role as one of
reasoning from past legal principles rather than from a polling of public opinion. Courts also
lack the means to take polls; they depend on the parties that come before them to provide
necessary information.
157 See id.; Terry M. Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the
NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SC. REV. 1094, 1101-02 (1985); Lawrence Susskind & Alan Weinstein,
Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution, 9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311,
320 (1980).

158 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ACTION COMMISSION TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND
DELAY, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY: PROJECT REPORTS AND RESEARCH FIND-

INGS 3 (1984); DOUGLAS J. Amy, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 19-20 (1987).

The expense of litigation is so great that even industry, which derives a relative advantage due
to its focused interests and concentrated financial resources, has begun to look seriously at

alternatives to litigation to resolve disputes. See Louis Fernandez, Let's Try CooperationInstead
of Confrontation, in BUSINESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 513, 513-19 (Kent Gilbreath ed., 2d

ed. 1984).
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adversarial; participants focus on claiming legal entitlements and furthering their private interests. In the course of zealously advocating
their individual interests, litigants lead the judicial process away from
achieving true understanding and finding common ground for consensus. 15 9 Parties to litigation ordinarily do not adequately represent
many potentially affected interest groups. They also do not tend to
modify their positions in response to discourse with their adversaries. 160 Contrary to the lessons of basic civics, the adversarial system
is neither good at revealing the truth nor facilitating the discovery of
public values.
The institutional limitations on the judiciary's ability to distill
common public values suggest that courts can better serve civic republican aims by reviewing decisions of the politically accountable
legislature to ensure that it engages in appropriate consensus-building
deliberation. Unfortunately, judicial review of congressional decisions
might, in practice, force courts to assume a primary role in defining
fundamental governmental policy.
The structure and decisionmaking processes of Congress are not
conducive to deliberation. Although legislative hearings nominally
allow various interest groups to present and explain their positions,
Congress, as a body, does not spend much time mulling over the
issues and arguments raised.161 Rather, it entrusts the clarification of
issues and drafting of proposed legislation to committees. 162 Major
committees control the legislative agenda and thereby greatly influence
and constrain the outcomes reached by the full body. 163 The members
of these committees must consider their own constituencies and special

159 Litigation-based regulation "is widely regarded as a zero-sum game in which lawyermercenaries battle in an interest group struggle from which only the lawyers profit." Richard
B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation,
x985 Wis. L. REV. 655, 655-56.
160 See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. i, ig22 (1982); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure
of Problemn Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 767-83 (1984).
161 See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 243 (1979) (reporting that in

1977, congressional representatives spent, on average, only eleven minutes per day studying

legislation). Although legislative hearings occur frequently, they are not the kind of discourse
envisioned by civic republicanism. Those called to testify generally give short statements and
then answer questions from committee members. See WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL,
THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 177-78 (6th ed. 1985). There is little opportunity for

the witness to respond to the testimony of others, and committee members often ask questions
as a thinly veiled means of making public statements of their views on an issue. See id. at 177
n.I3. In a sense, the hearings are a show, with interest groups sending to the Hill their bestknown, but usually not their best-informed, emissaries. See id. at 176-77.
162 See KEEFE & OGUL, supra note i61, at 172-73.
163 See William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative
Choice: The Political Consequences of JudicialDeference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv. 373,
386-87 (1988).
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interest supporters; they cannot realistically be expected to perform
their screening function primarily with the public interest in mind.
Instead, committee members typically engage in agenda control, vote
trading, and log-rolling in order to obtain votes for the regulatory
legislation that they support.164
By the time a bill reaches the floor of the House or Senate, it
reflects a myriad of political bargains and compromises. Thus, even
if one could characterize the floor debates as deliberative, the influence
of private interest groups would still taint the legislative process.
Moreover, much congressional debate reflects efforts by factions to get
their preferred readings of bills on the record in the hope that a court
or agency will interpret the statute in their favor. 165 Often, a majority
of members are absent from the floor during the so-called floor debate.16 6 Except perhaps when Congress debates legislation on highly
publicized issues of broad public concern, the legislative process facilitates coalition building and is antagonistic to the deliberative development of consensus about the public good. 167

164 Cf. Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI. 740, 741-44
(1983) (discussing "sophisticated behavior" by committee members). Committee staffs do perform
a valuable function by drafting legislation and by ironing out controversies so that the bills they
produce are likely to pass in the main body. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast,
The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 8i AM. POL. ScI. REV. 85, 89 (1987).
Committees, however, go about this task by using political influence and strategic behavior to
negotiate deals, not by engaging in deliberation, See KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 161, at 32022; MALBIN, supra note 6 x, at 245-51; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent
and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 429-35 (1988).
165 See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative
History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376-77. But cf. Farber & Frickey, supra note 164, at 444-46
(suggesting the possibility that legislative history may reveal a centrist core of meaning that
"generally illuminates the overall purposes of the statute").
166 A statement by Representative Hechler in the Congressional Record provides a poignant
indictment of conceptualizing the floor debate as a meaningful discourse about the purposes and
underlying values of a piece of legislation:
Mr. Speaker, having received unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD,
I would like to indicate that I am not really speaking these words. . . . As a matter of
fact, I am back in my office typing this out on my own hot little typewriter. . . . Such
is the pretense of the House that it would have been easy to just quietly include these
remarks in the RECORD, issue a brave press release, and convince thousands of cheering
constituents that I was in there fighting every step of the way, influencing the course of
history in the heat of debate.
117 CONG. REc. 36,5o6 (1971).
167 1 do not mean to assert that the public choice theory of interest group barter accurately
describes the legislative process. Rather, I believe that the process involves the simultaneous
concordance of many factors that may include political support by interest groups, broad political
concern caused by some external triggering event, the visibility and breadth of a regulatory
impact, and the positions in the legislature and administration of supporters of the proposed

regulation. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 215-18
(1984); KAY L. SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN
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The structure and decisionmaking processes of Congress also pose
problems for judicial review. No clear test identifies when the legislative process passes civic republican muster. 168 Courts could not
define such a test without inviting Congress to abuse it because Congress could easily formally respect the requirements laid down by the
judiciary without truly deliberating.' 69 Judges would have to exercise
great discretion in reviewing legislative hearings, committee reports,
and debates to ascertain whether legislators truly considered all significant points of view and policy implications of the legislation. That
the CongressionalRecord does not always reflect the legislative debate
would hopelessly complicate such a task. 1 70 Moreover, the courts
could not easily overcome these problems because they have no authority to require Congress to change its procedures. Given the difficulties that courts have in using legislative history to inform themselves about the meaning of statutory language, I am not sanguine
about their ability to use it to assess whether Congress engaged in a
fully deliberative process. Such an assessment would depend critically
on knowing how open-minded and honest legislators were when they
considered a statute.
Judicial inquiry into Congress's adherence to civic republican
norms would subject all congressional enactments to the threat of an
irreversible veto. Any time that a court found that Congress had not
satisfied civic republican criteria when passing legislation, it would
invalidate the statute in question. Congress's only recourse would be
to reenact the statute after more thorough deliberation, and even this
might be futile. 17 1 A court whose values conflicted with those expressed in a statute might repeatedly condemn the process by which
hence effectively prevent Congress from enCongress passed it, and
72
acting the provision.'
DEMOCRACY 314-17 (x986). The important point is that the legislative process is, by and large,
not a rational, deliberative one (although it involves elements of rational decisionmaking), but
rather one more dependent on happenstance.
168 Such a test could not easily focus on the outcome of legislation, because many of the
same outcomes that could be justified as serving the public interest might also be characterized
as benefiting particular interest groups. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the
Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74
VA. L. REV. 471, 472-73, 472 n.8 (8988). Explicit use of legislative histories suffers from the
possibly unavoidable problems previously noted. See Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. Cii. L. REv.
1203, 1215-17 (i99o); supra p. 1545.

169 Cf. ELY, supra note 28, at 127-29 (describing why a requirement that legislators articulate
their motivations for voting for a statute would be unlikely to elicit the desired response).
170 See supra note i66.
171See CALABRESI, supra note 30, at 163-66.
172 This scenario raises the possibility that Congress, seeking to ensure that its legislation
not be struck down, might create a constitutional crisis by attempting to deny the courts
jurisdiction to review the statute's constitutionality. Whether Congress has the power to do this
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Permitting administrative agencies to make policy, subject to judicial review to ensure a civic republican process, avoids many of the
problems with judicial review of congressional decisions. Judicial
review of agency action would certainly require the courts to exercise
great discretion in evaluating decisionmaking processes. But the
agency explanation of its decision and its comprehensive decisionmaking record would allow judicial inquiry to focus on whether the agency
permitted open discourse, addressed all significant concerns reflected
in the record, and generally provided a persuasive explanation of why
its decision furthers the public interest.173
More significantly, judicial nullification of an agency decision
would not cause problems as serious as those that result from the
nullification of a legislative decision. Because agencies have greater
flexibility to act quickly, they can more easily respond by reconsidering
and, if appropriate, reinstating overturned decisions. Agencies often
take such steps following judicial remand of agency actions found to
be arbitrary and capricious. 174 If a court were to overturn an agency
determination that in fact reflected a consensus about public values,
Congress could "overrule" the court by codifying the agency determination. 175 That legislative action might not satisfy the civic republican
is a celebrated open question of constitutional law. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court,
198o Term - Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 68-74 (1981); William W. Van Alstyne,
A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, I5 ARIz. L. REV. 229, 264-66 (973).
173 This is similar to what courts now do when they apply the "hard look" doctrine. See,
e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-52 (1989); Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44 (1983). The civic republican
standard would differ primarily in its expanded emphasis on judicial review of the agency's
explanation that its decision serves the public interest and in its suspicion of courts' invoking a
special authority to interpret statutes and thereby to second-guess well-reasoned agency policies.
See infra notes I81-182 and accompanying text.
174 See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology
for, and Report on, New Empirical Research, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 519, 534 (199o) (reporting
that agencies did not adopt "major changes" in 6o% of remands). In many cases, the courts
affirm the same decision they initially reversed and remanded. See, e.g., Food Mktg. Inst. v.
ICC, 587 F.2d 1285, 1287-89, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1978); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1332,
1344-45 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (977); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train,
513 F.2d 506, 507-09 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (x975).
175 For example, Congress recently codified the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
guidelines, which interpret the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 199i), to allow an employer to set benefits according to age
only when consideration of age is cost-justified. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of
1990, 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. i99I). Congress explicitly overruled a contrary
interpretation of the ADEA by the Supreme Court in Public Employees Retirement Sys. v.
Betts 492 U.S. 158, 169-75 (1989). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1988) (empowering the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to issue license amendments and interim licenses without prior hearings
in a limited class of cases after the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had held in Sholly v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 65i F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 198o), vacated, 459 U.S.
1194 (1983), that the statute did not give the NRC that authority).
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criteria should cause less concern in this context because Congress
would act after the deliberative administrative process and because
such action would not often be required. The need for Congress to
act would arise only if a court tried to impose its policy perspectives
on the agency. Finally, in rare instances of repeated judicial resistance
to an administratively implemented policy, Congress could restrict or
even eliminate the courts' jurisdiction to review agency action. In
essence, by delegating policymaking authority to a subordinate agency,
Congress allows the courts to review agency decisionmaking to ensure
that it comports with civic republican criteria without forfeiting the
primacy that the Constitution grants to Congress as the body of duly
elected representatives of the people.
My proposed civic republican understanding of the respective roles
of agencies and courts might also deter a well-meaning court from
illegitimately imposing its values on a regulatory scheme. Because
judges see themselves as the ultimate interpreters of congressional
meaning, they are apt subconsciously to read their values into regulatory statutes or accompanying legislative histories, which are often
padded with conflicting gloss inserted by legislators hoping for a sympathetic judicial ear. 176 Judges have continued to act in this manner
despite the Supreme Court's admonition in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 177 that courts are to defer to
agency interpretations of the statutes they administer unless the statute
clearly contradicts the agency's ruling. 178 After Chevron, if a reviewing court's values conflict with an agency's decision, the -court might
rely on its role as interpreter to overturn agency policy in either of
two ways: the court might find that the statute imparts a clear meaning that renders the agency decision unlawful; 179 alternatively, the
court might determine that the legislative provisions require the consideration of factors that the agency failed to take into account,
thereby rendering the agency's decision arbitrary and capricious. 180
My civic republican model explicitly provides that the reviewing
court's proper function is to ensure that the agency interpreted the
176 See Angus MacIntyre, A Court Quietly Rewrote the Federal Pesticide Statute: How
Prevalent is Judicial Statutory Revision?, 7 LAW & POL'Y 249, 265-66 (1985).
177 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
178 See id. at 842-43. For examples of cases in which judges have skirted Chevron deference,
see the cases cited below in notes 179-i8o.
179 See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293-94 (1988); INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446-49 (1987); Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d 1541, 1553-56 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). For a particularly egregious example of the use of statutory interpretation to overrule
a sound agency policy decision, see Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 827 F.2d 779 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (en banc), in which the court interpreted the Natural Gas Act to prohibit FERC from
setting rates that would have prevented a double recovery by gas companies of some of their
costs. See id. at 784, 792-93.

180 See, e.g., Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 80g F.2d 847, 852-54 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 819 (1987).
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statute in a deliberative manner. The court should not interfere with
the agency's use of its expertise and political awareness to reach a
decision that the agency truly believes is good policy. Nonetheless,
the court must make sure that the agency responded to all significant
comments regarding the wisdom of its interpretation. The court must
also make sure that the agency explained persuasively how its decision
furthers the public interest.1 8 1 In other words, a court reviewing an
agency interpretation must not measure the agency's action against
the court's own reading of the statute, but instead must ensure that
the agency followed the civic republican model of deliberative deci82
sionmaking. 1

To illustrate the benefit of my civic republican model of courtagency interaction, one could contrast it with the Supreme Court's
use of statutory interpretation in the Benzene case. 183 The case arose
because the Secretary of Labor felt obligated by Section 6(b)(5) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 184 to set the industry
standard for exposure to benzene at the lowest level achievable at a
cost that would not "impair the viability of the industries regulated."18 5
Reacting to the potential cost of the proposed standard, the Supreme
Court read Section 3(8) of the Act to require the Secretary first to find
that benzene posed a significant risk to worker health; thus, the Court

181Hence, my view of the respective roles of agencies and courts grants judges a more active
role than does Chevron. My view is instead closer to the requirement that Christopher Edley
proposes as part of his "sound governance" standard. See EDLEY, Supra note x8, 231 ("[T]he
court should communicate the reasons why the administrative record fails to instill confidence
and provide clear guidance as to how the agency can assure the court that the administrative
action is sound."). The republican notions of access, persuasive discourse and consensus, I
believe, provide significant flesh for Edley's "sound governance" skeleton. But cf. Edley, supra
note i8, at 593 (critiquing civic republican conceptions as overly procedural, normatively empty,
and utopian, and therefore concluding that civic republicanism is "an unstable way station for
something else in the realm of theory").
182For an opinion illustrating both the civic republican and pluralist approach, see Brae
Corp. v. United States, 74o F.2d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
IO69 (1985). In Brae, the D.C. Circuit first demanded that the ICC prove its deregulation
decision to be good policy, see id. at 1o36-44, but in a later section of the opinion reverted to
reading the legislative history of the Staggers Act as manifesting a legislative deal on behalf of
small, regional railroads, see id. at 1048-49.
183 Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607
(I98o). To be sure, the Benzene case is pre-Chevron; nonetheless, it is useful in demonstrating
a type of judicial activism that I believe ought to be avoided.
184 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988).
185 Benzene, 448 U.S. at 613 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion).

Section 6(b)(5) provides: "The
Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents
under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1988).

Because the Secretary found that

there was a "causal connection between benzene and leukemia," he believed that no safe exposure
level could be determined. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 613.
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remanded the proceeding for such a determination. 186 Unfortunately,
the Court's interpretation ignored the fact that scientific evidence often
will fail to resolve whether low levels of toxins pose a "significant"
risk.' 8 7 Hence, the Benzene decision seriously hinders the regulation
of toxic substances even in instances in which the Secretary could
persuasively justify regulation. 18 8 The Secretary's easiest (and perhaps
only) solution to this problem would be to clothe her policy judgments
in technical language and claim that the evidence supported the finding of significant risk. Because courts often are incapable, and certainly hesitant, to declare such conclusions erroneous, the decision
would then escape exacting judicial review. 18 9 This deferential review, however, encourages such evils as capture and sloppy decisionmaking.
The civic republican understanding would avoid these scenarios
in which courts and agencies work at cross-purposes. An agency
would not subject itself to reversal by admitting that it could not
generate data implicitly required by a statute. Instead, the reviewing
court would affirm the agency if the agency demonstrated that it
interpreted the statutory requirements reasonably in light of scientific
or economic limitations. This standard of review would encourage
agency candor about its policy rationales - candor that would better
persuade courts of the soundness of agency policies. 190 The review
process would become a meaningful dialogue between court and
agency in which the court stands in for the knowledgeable citizen that
the agency must persuade to accept the regulatory policy.
2. Availability of Review by Politically Accountable Branches. Because courts are more insulated from the political pulse of the
people than are agencies, judicial review alone is insufficient to ensure
that agency policies remain true to the polity's consensus values. The
place of administrative agencies in American constitutional government, however, also permits Congress and the President to review

186 See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 639-40. Section 3(8) provided: "The term 'occupational safety
and health standard' means a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one
or more practices . . . reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1988).
187 See Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO.
L.J. 729, 740-49 (,979).
188 See EDLEY, supra note 18, at 9o-91, 91 n.42.
189 See id. at 77 (suggesting that had OSHA subsequently relied on the same data and found
a significant risk to health, the Court most likely would not have reversed again); see also Peter
Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in tile Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 277, 331-35 (1985) (arguing that courts are not as institutionally competent as
agencies to manage public risk).
190 For an example of this type of judicial review, see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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agency policies with an eye toward popularly held values. Although
review by Congress and the President by no means ensures the fidelity
of agency policy to a consensus of the common good, such review
cabins agency decisionmaking so that it cannot stray too far from that
consensus. 191
Congress's most direct reaction to an agency policy with which it
disagrees is an explicit statutory override of an agency decision. Legislators typically override agency action, however, only when they
realize that the agency decision poses a political problem, and when
they are also able to agree on a solution that their constituencies
support. Because overrides entail significant transaction costs, they
occur infrequently. 19 2 In addition, overrides make legislators vulnerable to attack by interest groups whose immediate private interests
the legislation threatens. 1 93 Finally, such legislation must first pass
through the subcommittees and committees responsible for the particular area of regulation. Of late, party influence and seniority have
become less significant to the workings of the committee system. In
the absence of these organizing forces, committees often cannot forge
the coalitions necessary for legislative action. 194 These factors contribute to an institutional inertia that undercuts the effectiveness of
direct legislative reaction as a regular means of checking agency policymaking. Nevertheless, on several occasions, Congress has modified
agency determinations that it found too extreme. 195
More often, Congress uses its power of the purse to keep agencies
from adopting policies that stray from the desires of affected interest
groups. 196 In the scramble for legislative appropriations, an agency
191 Arthur Maass has suggested that Congress's role might more appropriately be viewed as
checking executive policy-setting and implementation rather than leading the drive toward policy
formation. See ARTHUR MAASS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 8-18 (983).
192 See McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 67, at 434; McCubbins & Schwartz, supra
note 73, at 168-69.
193 See Pierce, supra note 57, at 1245-46.

194 See Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The House in Transition: Change and
Consolidation, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 31, 40-49 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 2d ed. 198i); David E. Price, CongressionalCommittees in the Policy Process, in
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra, at 156, 156-7o. But cf. MAASS, supra note 191, at 8-Is
(asserting that Congress does play a crucial role in ensuring that legislation furthers the common

good).
195 Perhaps the most noted recent example is Congress's reaction to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) adoption, in 1972, of interim rules that required
automobile manufacturers to install either passive restraints or ignition interlocks that prevented
a driver from starting her car unless the seatbelt was fastened.

See 49 C.F.R. § 1.51 (1973).

Most manufacturers chose the less expensive interlock system, which proved to be extremely
unpopular. In 1974, Congress passed the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments,
which, among other things, rescinded the ignition interlock requirement. See Pub. L. No. 93492, tit. I, § Io2(b)(i), 88 Stat. 1470, 1477 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14Iob (1988)).
196 See PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES 55-56 (1989).
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needs an advocate on Capitol Hill - especially one on the appropriations subcommittee that oversees the agency's regulatory program. 197
Appropriations subcommittees frequently specify which programs are
to receive funds. They also engage in non-statutory control over
agency programs, for example, by requiring the agency to give the
subcommittee advance notice of changes from the mutually understood
allocation of appropriated funds. 198 Although the White House's role
in reviewing and coordinating budget requests from the various agencies complicates the influence of appropriations committees, evidence
suggests that agency policies do respond to changes in the make-up
and prevailing ideology of the agencies' appropriations committees. 199
Presidential review of agency policy is another means that brings
the values of the electorate to bear on agency decisions. White House
review, when properly structured, encourages deliberation and public
interest oriented policymaking. The President answers to the entire
electorate and thus has an incentive to oppose policies that hurt the
20 0
general public more than they help particular interest groups.
Three factors, however, temper the desirability of relying on presidential oversight of agency policy. First, the Office of Management
and Budget, the White House arm for agency review, does not have
the expertise to make ultimate regulatory decisions and may itself
have an anti-regulatory bias. 20 1 Second, even in national elections,
the electoral process biases outcomes toward the status quo and the
interests of powerful groups. 20 2 Third, allowing any centralized institution under the direct control of one individual to dictate policy
invites decisionmakers to rely on backroom discussions and, more
generally, to subvert deliberative processes, even if that individual is
electorally accountable. 203

197 Traditionally, appropriations committees countered the pressures of the substantive oversight committees to support regulatory programs, but recently they too have become springboards
that facilitate program advocates in making demands on the public fisc. See LANCE T. LELOUP,
THE FISCAL CONGRESS: LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF THE BUDGET IO9 (198o); ALLEN SCHICK,
CONGRESS AND MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING AND TAXING 415-40 (1980).

198 See MAASS, supra note 191, at 138-40.
199 See Weingast & Moran, supra note 66, at 791-93.
200 See Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the Presidentand OMB in Informal

Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 18i, 19o (1986); cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of
Constitutionaland Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REv. 469, 522-23 (1985)
(arguing that, after Chevron, executive control over agency policymaking may result in greater
political accountability).
201 See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 20o, at 191-92.
202 See supra note 121.
203 There are those who allege that OMB has already used Executive Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
§ 127 (1981), to subvert the regulatory process to serve surreptitiously powerful private interests.
See, e.g., JONATHAN LASH, KATHERINE GILMAN & DAVID SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS

23-25 (1984); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way
to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. lO59, io62-63 (1986); Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift
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With some restructuring to address these problems, White House
review of agency policy could help prevent agency capture and ideological parochialism. Executive Order 12,291 already requires each
agency to submit cost-benefit analyses of major rules for detailed OMB
review. 20 4 These analyses force the agency to expand its regulatory
outlook beyond the factors it has traditionally considered paramount. 20 5 In addition, Executive Order 12,498 mandates that an
agency formulate a "regulatory program" before undertaking proceedings to implement its policies, 20 6 which forces the agency to prioritize
its policies and consider them in light of limited resources. 20 7 Having
agencies develop a regulatory agenda also facilitates White House
coordination of various agencies' policies to ensure that they are consistent. 20 8 Finally, detailed review by the White House communicates
the administration's views on the values underlying a proposed policy,
which, in turn, may reflect public sentiments on the issue. An agency
might welcome such information in light of its responsibility to guide
its regulatory ward through a labyrinth of technology, politics, and
law.
The President's appointment power can also profoundly affect regulatory policy. 20 9 The President should appoint agency members who
share her perspective on matters that the agency will address. Assum-

of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. I, 55-57, 60-62
(1984).

204See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (Iq8i), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 6oi (1988).
205 See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075, IO8O-82 (1986). In order for OMB review to serve its
deliberation-enhancing function legitimately, however, OMB should not have the authority to
dictate outcomes to agencies either directly or by the threat of delays that are so great that they
essentially undermine agency policy. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 200, at 191-92 (discussing the dangers of OMB control). See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, PresidentialControl
of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. Rv. 443, 445 (1987) (arguing that the
executive's role in controlling agency decisionmaking should be limited). Also, if OMB review
is to contribute to the ultimate deliberation, the dialogue between the OMB and the agency
promulgating the rule must be part of the rulemaking record. Otherwise there will be no check
on OMB's assertions, and White House influence will not be subject to knowledgeable political
constraint. See Morrison, supra note 203, at 1o67-68; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 200, at
192-93.

206 See Exec. Order No. 12,498. 3 C.F.R. § 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 6o (1988).
207 See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 205, at 1087; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 200,
at 187. Unfortunately, the impact of Executive Order 12,498 on the deliberative nature of
agenda setting is limited because the public is not involved, and the agenda is not subject to
any judicial scrutiny.
203 See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 205, at 1082; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 200,
at i89-9o.

209 See STRAUSS, supra note 196, at 63-68; Moe, supra note 157, at ilOI; Terry M. Moe,
Regulatory Performance and PresidentialAdministration, 26 Am. J. POL. ScI. 197, 200-01
(1982).
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ing that this perspective was a factor in the President's election, the
result would be an agency decisionmaker who harbored many of the
relevant basic values and public aspirations of the national electorate.
None of the mechanisms for judicial and political oversight of
agency action, taken alone, ensures that agencies will not pursue their
own goals and agendas. Nonetheless, the mechanisms reinforce one
another as means of limiting agency discretion. This intricate interplay seems to suggest that meaningful political constraints do exist,
at least against agencies' pursuing goals far afield from those desired
2 10
by the interest groups affected.
B. The Structure of the Bureaucracy
In addition to administrative agencies' place in government, their
internal structure also encourages deliberative decisionmaking aimed
at furthering public rather than private values. At the core of almost
every agency is a professional staff, chosen for its knowledge rather
than for its political views or affiliations. 21 1 The staff forms the base
of a pyramid that has the ultimate decisionmakers, who are generally
political appointees, at the apex. Although these appointees generate
the agency's policy agenda, they depend on the bureaucrats below to
evaluate the various alternatives for implementing broad policies. 2 12
Career staff members derive their power primarily from their professional training and their relationships with interest group representatives who frequently control important information - in other words,
from job-specific expertise. This expertise allows bureaucrats to exert
significant influence on public policy even when their role is merely
advisory. 2 13 Although career staff rarely initiate consideration of general policies, the debate over policy alternatives often starts at lower
levels and travels up the pyramid. This process has the potential to
focus the debate on a professional understanding of the public interest
rather than on accommodation of private interests.
210 See Moe, supra note 157, at 1114-15. Unfortunately, the political influence of Congress
and the President has often translated into encouragement of agencies to pursue goals that civic
republicanism considers illegitimate. Whether a republican model of judicial review together
with other institutional constraints can channel political influence to check agencies from straying
from the polity's notions of the public good remains uncertain.
211 See FREDERICK C. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 112-13 (2d ed.
1982); Samuel H. Beer, The Adoption of General Revenue Sharing: A Case Study in Public
Sector Politics, 24 PUB. POL. 127, 157-6o (1976); Frederick C. Mosher, Professions in Public

Service, 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 144, 145-46 (1978).
212 See KINGDON, supra note 167, at 32-35; B. Guy PETERS, THE POLITICS OF BUREAU-

CRACY 137-41 (1978); William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85
YALE L.J. 38, 52-55 (I975); Wallace S. Sayre, Dilemmas and Prospects of the Federal Government Service, Introduction to THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE 1, 2 (Wallace S. Sayre
ed., 2d ed. 1965).
213 See KINGDON, supra note 167, at 35-37; FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 17-25 (2d ed. 1976).
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r. The Professional Rather than Political Nature of the Staff. Interest group representatives may suggest a policy alternative because
the group has a private interest in seeing the change adopted, but
non-political staff members evaluate proposals from their professional
perspective. 2 14 Staff bureaucrats focus on what they believe the public
interest is and whether the suggested policy furthers it. Whether an
agency staff member will forward a suggested alternative up the
agency pyramid depends on the ability of interest group representatives to persuade her that, in her professional judgment, the alterna2 15
tive satisfies some public goal.

Agencies are generally divided into staff offices that bring to a
regulatory problem unique and perhaps parochial professional values
and conceptions of the public interest. 2 16 It is only through discussion
among such offices that a policy emerges that can serve a more
universal consensus of the common good. 2 17 If, in fact, all staff
members share a single professional background or even come from
only a few professions, staff discussions might push agency policy
toward a consensus shared by only part of society. If, however,
agencies assign some staff members to interact with each different
interest group and address its concerns - essentially to see that
interest group as their clientele 2 18 - it is more likely that intra-agency
discourse would respond to all of the public's concerns.
The coal scrubbing controversy illustrates how this staff dynamic
might work. The EPA Office of Air Quality represented the environmental interests who read the i977 amendments to the Clean Air Act
to demand scrubbing. The Office of Planning represented general

214 See David Goetze, The Shaping of Environmental Attitudes in Air Pollution Control
Agencies, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 423, 423-24 (1981); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Role of Regulatory Analysis in Regulatory Decisionmaking, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, RECOMIMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 107, 124-28 (1985); Charles Pruitt, People
Doing Vhat They Do Best: The Professional Engineers and NHTSA, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
363, 365-67 ('979). The "professional" perspective of agency staff members might reflect the
office they work for more than just their professional educational background. See Errol
Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 LAW & POL'y 355, 373-74 (1987).
215 See McGarity, supra note 214, at 126-27. McGarity, however, also contends that numerous institutional factors pressure technical staff members to promulgate some sort of regulations. See id.
216 See CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY: A PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
POLEMIC 13 1-32 (2d ed. 1985); Carl J. Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative

Responsibility, I PUB. POL. 3, 12-14 (1940).
217 See Friedrich, supra note 216, at 22-24; McGarity, supra note 214, at 139.
218 1 have borrowed the term "clientele" from Joseph La Palombara, see JOSEPH LA PALOMBARA, INTEREST GROUPS IN ITALIAN POLITICS 262 (1964), to suggest that although an interest

group depends on staff members for "representation" of its interests in the regulatory process,
the staff members depend on the interest group to justify their institutional existence. Cf.
KRISLOV & ROSENBLOOM, supra note 46, at 99 (describing this sort of symbiotic relationship

between an interest group and an agency as one of agency clientele).
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economic interests. 2 19 Although "turf battles" between these offices
did play a distorting role, even at the staff level, 220 the interaction

between the offices resulted in a proposed simple ceiling on sulphur
emissions. The proposed ceiling would have reduced sulphur emissions more than the standard ultimately adopted (satisfying the environmentalists), and would have saved hundreds of millions of dollars
(satisfying the economists). 22 1 Unfortunately, backers of eastern coal
intervened politically at the top levels of the agency and torpedoed
222
this proposal.
The coal scrubbing example also suggests that despite staff debate,
the ultimate agency decisionmakers may not concern themselves with
assessing the effects of a policy on the public interest as much as with
satisfying powerful interest groups or the constituents of agency supporters in Congress. Courts, however, could review agency decisions
to ensure that they were deliberative and demand that politicallyappointed agency members consider how a policy will affect what the
staff and interest groups have identified as the public interest. With
such a requirement, a decisionmaker faced with outsiders' arguments
and staff analyses about whether a policy serves the public interest
would either have to accept them or explain why they are not dispositive. Although judicial review would not entirely preclude an
agency from setting policy based on private interest accommodation,
it would at least ensure that the policy could be justified as a means
2 23
of furthering some widely accepted notion of the common good.
Some provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)22 4 and

administrative law doctrine seem to recognize implicitly the important
role that staff can play in influencing agency decisionmaking. In
formal hearings, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)225 almost always

presides and issues an initial or recommended decision. 226 To the
extent that ALJs exercise policymaking discretion, 227 they tend to

219
220
221
222
223

See
See
See
See

Ackerman & Hassler, supra note 59, at 1536-37.
id. at 1539-40.
id. at 1545.
id. at 1548-49.

See Sunstein, supra note io,at 63-64; cf. EDLEY, supra note 18, at 194 (arguing that
hard look review limits an agency's use of politics to decide between "otherwise reasonable
alternative constructions of the evidence").
224 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-7o6 (1988).
225 See id. § 556(b)(3).
226 See id. § 557(b). The APA requires a preliminary ALJ decision in every formal proceeding
over which an ALJ presides, except for the narrow exception when "the agency finds on the
record that due and timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably ... requires
[bypassing the ALJ's decision]." Id. § 557(b)(2).

227 Many ALJs today preside over the enormous quantity of Social Security cases, which
primarily involve taking evidence and making findings of fact; the sheer volume of such cases
implies that the impact of ALJs on agency policy will be neither systemic nor significant. The
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justify their policy choices by invoking public-interest oriented statutory or regulatory purposes and established agency policies. Although
the initial or recommended decisions may have political overtones in
terms of who "wins" and "loses," the outcomes generally are not driven
by explicit political concerns. 228 Of course, an ALJ's tentative resolution of a policy issue may not withstand review by the agency,
which makes its ultimate decision de novo and thus ostensibly need
not heed the initial or recommended decision. 22 9 In practice, however,
the parties must make their arguments to the agency members "on
exception" from the ALJ's decision, which therefore defines the parameters by which the agency will ultimately evaluate the policy at
issue. 2 30 Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
agency must explicitly address the ALJ's findings and rationales if it
23 1
rejects the recommended decision.
Unfortunately, this limited use of staff and ALJs to remove issues
from immediate political pressures does not ensure that the agency
deliberates about the public interest before it adopts a new policy.
Staff and ALJs play this role only in formal proceedings, which, like
judicial hearings, are not conducive to deliberative dialogue and tend
to restrict interest group access. 2 32 There are no analogous APA
provisions or administrative law doctrines that recognize staff involvement in the formulation and analysis of agency policy in informal
rulemakings, the paradigmatic process for agency policy-setting, or in
the more informal interactions that occur before official proceedings
commence. 23 3 More troubling, the push for many agency policies
comes from elected officials and appointed agency heads, 234 whom
interest groups are more likely to influence. Policy considerations
driven from the top down send staff members a message not to filter
out purely political arguments.

role of ALJs in other regulatory agencies, however, often does involve preliminary determination
of important policy issues.
228 ALJs' decisions are political to the extent that they take into account legitimate agency
policies that have a bearing on their cases. However, the APA insulates ALJs from direct
influence by agency heads and the rest of the agency staff with respect to particular decisions.
See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) ( 19 88). Reagan-era attempts to pressure ALJs directly to deny social
security benefits with greater frequency are troubling precisely because these attempts suggest
that ALJs may react to direct political influence. See Victor W. Palmer & Edwin S. Bernstein,
Establishing FederalAdministrative Law Judges as an Independent Corps: The Heflin Bill, 6
IV. NEW ENG. L. REv. 673, 694 (1984).
229 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1988).
230 See id. § 557.
231 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495-96 (195x).
232 See supra notes 158-16o and accompanying text.
233 For a rare example of a case in which a court explicitly recognized that staff experience
may significantly enlighten policy choices, see Judge Breyer's opinion in Donovan v. A. Amorello
& Sons, Inc., 761 F.2d 6i, 66 (ist Cir. 1985).
234 See KINGDON, supra note 167, at 23-33.
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The problem of agencies ignoring their staffs' professional perspective is surmountable. It is not a problem inherent in the structure
of the agency but rather one that results from jettisoning valuable
attributes of that structure that might discourage factional decisionmaking. For example, one could address the problem of agency decisionmaking from the top down by amending the APA to give potentially affected groups and agency staff a greater role in initial policy
formulation.235 Additionally, Congress and the President could require agencies to announce publicly and then to justify a policy-setting
agenda.236
More troublesome is the propensity of agencies to marginalize the
values of those outside the political mainstream. This problem is
intractable in large part because neither the professional ethic of the
staff nor the political ethic of agency heads is likely to incorporate
these values. 23 7 It is not clear, however, that the alternatives legislative or judicial definition and implementation of policy - would
respect non-conforming values any more than the administrative state.
Although I see no institutional method of alleviating this problem
entirely, reviewing courts could demand that agencies explicitly address all relevant arguments made by fringe groups. This requirement
would at least trigger a sensitivity to non-mainstream perspectives at
two levels - at the agency upon initial consideration and the courts
upon review.
235 Congress recently took a big step in this direction when it adopted the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. IOI-648, § 3(a), 104 Stat. 4969, 4970-77 (codified at 5

U.S.C.A. §§ 581-590 (West Supp. I99I)). Negotiated rulemaking brings the major affected
interest groups together before policy is formulated to try to work out regulation that benefits
all interests. For a description of negotiated rulemaking, see Harter, supra note 16o, at 28-31;
Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 157, at 314-23; and Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation
as an Alterative to TraditionalRulemaking, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1871, 1874-80 (I98i). This
approach, however, is not problem-free; it often does not result in any agreement on regulations,
might ultimately encourage intransigence of the agency during the rulemaking proceeding with
respect to changes in a negotiated proposed rule, and therefore might deprive non-mainstream
interest groups of an equal opportunity to influence policy.
236 Creating some public process by which agencies formulate agendas would improve judicial
monitoring of agency failure to further the public interest by giving judges some record for
reviewing petitions challenging an agency's refusal to adopt a rule or policy. Cf. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 6o6 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("Judicial review
of agency decisions not to adopt rules would help ensure that the agency gives due consideration
to citizen participation, and in this sense might actually enhance the agency's effectiveness in
furthering the public interest."); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programsand
Private Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. II93, 1267-89 (1982) (discussing judicially-created initiation
rights and noting both their benefits and the enforcement problems they create).
237 By most measures, the public service accurately mirrors the general population in both
composition and policy attitudes. See GOODSELL, supra note 216, at 82-88. There are, however,
a few glaring distortions in the representativeness of the public bureaucracy: blacks and women
are underrepresented in upper levels (that is, policy influencing levels), see id. at 85, and the
bureaucracy on the whole is skewed toward middle class values, see KRiSLov & ROSENBLOOM,
supra note 46, at 59.
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2. The Pyramidal Structure of Agencies. The pyramidal structure of agencies dovetails with the professional ethic of their staffs to
foster interest group access, deliberation, and feedback. The presence
of many staff members at the career level and the organization of
staff into divisions with particular responsibilities permit interest
group representatives to identify and communicate with public officials
sympathetic to their perspectives. Interest group representatives and
staff can discuss potential agency policies and the staff's tendency is
to focus the discussion away from pure political concerns. 238 Agency
staff also can carry credible interest group concerns to the upper
echelons of the agency and can carry agency responses back to the
interest groups.
Again, I am not arguing that staff members adequately perform
these soundingboard and conduit functions in most agencies today.
Only focused interest groups that participate repeatedly in agency
affairs learn that staff can play these valuable roles and recognize
which staff members are best at it. Hence, these "insider" interest
groups derive an unfair advantage because of their relationships with
career-level staff. The most powerful interest groups often can even
appeal directly to agency members or their close advisors. To approximate civic republican ideals more effectively, Congress should
discourage these "sweetheart" relationships, perhaps by requiring
agencies to document publicly even informal contact between agency
officials and interest group representatives. In addition, the government should counter the disincentives that deter unfocused interest
groups from participating in agency proceedings. These disincentives,
which are created by the costs of participation and are exacerbated
by free rider problems, justify government reimbursement of interest
23 9

groups that succeed in altering agency policy.

C. Agency Policymaking Procedures
The availability of agency procedures that facilitate access and
public interest oriented discourse provides a third basis for my optimism about the ability of the administrative state to implement a civic
238 See supra notes 214-2 18 and accompanying text.
239 Cf. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 58o
(i99o) (suggesting cost reduction and a fee award scheme for shareholders who successfully
challenge corporate policy as means of enhancing shareholder participation in corporate governance). With certain exceptions, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (I988), already
provides an award of fees and expenses to private litigants who prevail in an agency adjudication. See id. § 504(a)(I). This statute, however, is tailored to encourage private parties to
vindicate their rights and to curb unreasonable exercises of government authority, not to mandate
a more deliberative decisionmaking process. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96481, § 202, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325 (I98O) (findings and purposes); H.R. REp. No. 1418, 9 6th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12 (i98o); Commissioner, INS v. Jean, I1o S. Ct. 2316, 2321 (1990).
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republican model of policymaking. In particular, the paradigmatic
process for agency formulation of policy - informal rulemaking - is
specifically geared to advance the requirements of civic republican
theory. Informal rulemaking requires public notice sufficient to inform
interest groups that the agency is considering a policy that might
affect them. 240 Any group that keeps abreast of developments at a
particular agency or regularly reviews the Federal Register learns of
the agency's commencement of an informal rulemaking proceeding.
Comment procedures provide relatively easy access to the discourse
among interest groups and the dialogue between those groups and
decisionmakers.
The availability of rulemaking procedures, however, fuels my optimism only to a limited extent. The actual procedures that agencies
use may discourage them from taking advantage of the discourse that
notice and comment rulemaking can produce. The most pervasive
problem with informal rulemaking is that an agency usually investigates the issues and has its staff perform preliminary analyses of
regulatory options before it initiates a rulemaking proceeding. 24 1 Because this preliminary work is done without organized public input,
the interest groups not involved in the preliminary stages may feel
excluded from the rulemaking process and assume an antagonistic
attitude upon a rule's proposal.242 Moreover, if only "insider" interest
groups have input into the preliminary stages of a rule's development,
24 3
An agency can
the rule itself is apt to favor their private interests.
analyses that
staff
data
and
withholding
by
problems
these
exacerbate
may have prompted it to initiate the rulemaking proceeding or to
formulate the proposed rule as it did. Furthermore, informal rulemaking proceedings do not mandate that parties have an opportunity
to respond to comments filed by other groups. The only chance to
respond may be through a petition for reconsideration or for judicial
review, and by that time, the agency and "insider" groups are likely
to have crystallized their positions and hence to view other parties as
adversaries. As a result, informal rulemaking often does not generate

240 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1988); Florida Power & Light Co.
v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1045 (1989); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1258, 1283 (ist Cir. I987).
241 See Pederson, supra note 212, at 51-59.
242 Robert Reich has hypothesized that much of the antagonism begins in the informal

preliminary stages because interest group representatives, especially those working for industry,
are lawyers concerned about preserving their positions and informational advantages for future
proceedings. See Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confrontation or Negotiation?, 59 HARV.
Bus. REv., May-June 1981, at 82, 86-91.
243 See Roy A. Schotland, After 25 Years: We Come to Praise the APA and Not to Bury It,
24 ADMIN. L. REv. 261, 266-67 (1972); Stewart, supra note 9, at 1775.
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true discourse but rather encourages participants to pursue their pri244
vate interests single-mindedly.
Despite the flaws in current rulemaking practices, Congress and
the courts can act to overcome the institutional problems outlined
above. In several cases, courts have struck down regulations promulgated when the agency did not first disclose the scientific data
upon which it relied, because the regulations ignored meaningful industry comments. 245 In other cases, judges have added an opportunity for additional rounds of comments after the agency has changed
its position. 246 Both types of court action help ensure that rulemaking
proceedings fulfill their potential as vehicles for civic republican deliberation. Requirements that agencies reveal the value choices inherent in the selection of one rule over an alternative and that they
encourage representatives of various interests to discuss fundamental
24 7
issues would also further civic republican aims.
Additional problems arise, however, because agencies frequently
set policy outside the rulemaking paradigm - either in non-binding
policy statements or as part of fact-specific adjudications. I have
already explained how formal adjudicatory proceedings limit access
and discourage deliberation. 248 Setting policy by informal adjudication or by issuing general policy statements only magnifies these problems.
The Administrative Procedure Act grants agencies virtually complete discretion over the procedures they use to conduct informal
adjudication and to issue general statements of policy. 249 In both
contexts, agencies obtain their data and views about policies they
might adopt from selective sources. Only "active players" who work

244 See STRAUSS, supra note 196, at 169-71; Harter, supra note 16o, at 22.
245 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir.
1977).

246 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). The Supreme Court's holding that courts may not add to
APA procedures, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978), has discouraged lower courts from adding procedural
requirements. See generally Alfred S. Neely, IV, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Response and Reaction in the Federal Judiciary, 14
U. BALT. L. REv. 256, 264-307 (1985) (summarizing the response to Vermont Yankee by the
lower courts). Lower courts, however, may still insist on a deliberative process by tying the
requirements to the basic provisions of the APA, such as the requirement of "meaningful notice,"
see, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1212 ( 5 th Cir. i9i), or by premising
their opinions on substantive inadequacies in agencies' explanation of their decisions, see, e.g.,
Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 9o8, 926-31 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
247 Cf. Reich, supra note 13, at 1638-40 (suggesting that administrative agencies should foster
national debate on value-laden issues).
248 See supra notes i58-16o and accompanying text.
249 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(A) (1988).
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closely with agency personnel have any chance to address the issues
raised by the adoption of these policies. No requirements of an open
record or public discussion operate to constrain pure political influence
or an agency's pursuit of a private agenda. 250 For statements of
policy, the usual justification for the absence of any required procedures is the non-binding nature of such statements. 25 1 From a civic
republican perspective, however, this justification is inadequate. Subsequent agency adjudicatory proceedings are adversarial and hence
probably will not cure the lack of opportunities for access and deliberation. 25 2 The adversarial nature of subsequent proceedings will be
aggravated by the fact that the agency has already committed itself
to a position and may be reluctant to consider seriously arguments to
the contrary.
As the above discussion illustrates, agency policy-setting has the
potential to advance civic republican goals. But the same attributes
that suggest that agencies can provide civic republican benefits their place in American constitutional democracy, their structure, and
the decisionmaking processes that they use - may also permit and
even facilitate domination of the polity by either the decisionmakers
themselves or by private interest groups that have co-opted the system
to serve their private preferences. In other words, heavy reliance on
the administrative state to set policy creates a substantial risk of a
government that not only fails to deliver the promises of civic republicanism, but stumbles into many of its pitfalls as well.

IV.

AvOIDING THE PITFALLS OF

Civic

REPUBLICANISM

The potential pitfalls inherent in a civic republican government
fall into four distinct categories. The first two categories encompass
pitfalls that result from an inability to ensure that decisionmakers act

250 Courts, however, have construed APA review under the arbitrary and capricious standard
to mandate that the agency explain the bases of its challenged decisions, even those made
through informal proceedings. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 420 (1971). Courts have also adopted the requirement of an agency record in informal
proceedings, which includes the material the agency considered in reaching its decision. See id.
at 419. In addition, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. iggi), and the
Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1988), enable private citizens to obtain
information about agencies' informal communications. See STRAuSS, supra note x96, at 16364. These doctrines and statutes go a long way toward discouraging decisions that purely
enhance private interests.
251 An entity may challenge a statement of policy when the agency applies it in a particular
adjudicatory proceeding. See American Hosp. Ass'n v Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046-47 (D.C.
Cir. 2987); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1481-82 (iith Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
727 F.2d 957 (zith Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (i985).

252 See supra p. 1562.
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with the public interest rather than personal gain in mind. 253 In the
absence of oversight, regulators may engage in conduct aimed directly
at fulfilling their private preferences. If, however, a powerful special
interest group monitors the regulator, that group might offer inducements that entice the regulator to serve its private interests. This is
the classic capture scenario. 254 The second two categories include
pitfalls that can result even if regulators act with the public interest
in mind, because the process of reaching consensus may go awry.
Even the publicly minded regulator may enjoy sufficient freedom from
oversight to impose unintentionally her unique conception of the public good on the polity. Alternatively, if majoritarian institutions closely
monitor the regulator, they might force her to adopt laws that embody
only the dominant culture's background and values. I believe, however, that with properly structured constraints on agency discretion,
the administrative state can avoid the pitfalls of civic republicanism.
A. Regulation that Promotes Decisionmakers'
Private Interests
Unless other government institutions or private interest groups
impose constraints, regulators will often pursue their own private
interests. This pursuit partially explains the failure of the New Deal
agency model, which naively assumed that regulators would diligently
implement statutory goals. History has shown that all too often regulators shirk their responsibilities; they prefer the leisure and security
255
that accompanies the continuation of what is routine.

253 Personal gains include any personal utility the regulator derives from continued officeholding such as power, prestige, convenience, and security, as well as pecuniary benefits. See
ANTHONY DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 84-85 (1967).
254 Marver Bernstein provided the classic explanation of capture in his description of the life
cycle of an agency. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 86-9o, I55-6o. More recent economic
theory also predicts that industries will try to capture agencies. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note
122, at 5-6.
25SSee BERNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 88-92; DOWNS, supra note 253, at 18-20, 96-1oo. It
should be remembered, however, that failure to take the initiative is a malady that befalls
legislators as well as agency decisionmakers. An elected representative who actively promotes
a public policy runs the risk of losing some voter support, usually without any meaningful
potential for gaining votes. See MORRIS FIORINA, REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES 36-38 (1974); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY

AGENCIES 88-89 (1981). Incumbent legislators generally enjoy greater name recognition, resources for publicity, and ability to help their constituents deal with government "red tape" than
their challengers, which gives them an inherent electoral advantage. See FIORINA, supra note
121, at 98-1oi (arguing that increases in the retention rates of incumbent legislators are due
primarily to their ability to perform direct services for their constituents). Thus the safest
strategy for incumbents single-mindedly seeking reelection may be to obfuscate their positions
to avoid the backlash of disgruntled voters who may represent the only true threat to their
reelection.
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Hence, civic republican theory must address the phenomenon of
agency lethargy. Two interrelated approaches can help solve the problem of agency shirking. First, requiring agencies to state and justify
their agendas would focus attention on agencies that do not take
sufficient steps to meet their statutory mandates. At present, agencies
tend to set their agendas in political rather than in more deliberative
forums. 256 Media coverage of announced agendas could generate po-

litical pressure on Congress and the President to remedy extreme cases
of shirking. If the history of the administrative state teaches us anything, however, it is that private interest groups are more dedicated
and probably more efficient monitors of agency actions than are government officials. Legislators and the President may prefer the relative
stability and lack of controversy that often accompany agency inaction. Hence, the formal involvement of the public in setting an agency's agenda might be needed to goad agency officials into explicitly
considering long-term regulatory goals. To give teeth to private monitors, courts could consider the announced agenda and the record
leading to its adoption when reviewing agency refusals to initiate
rulemakings or to enforce statutory provisions. 25 7
In addition to shirking, officials' self-interest also creates incentives
for them to augment their regulatory authority. Greater power allows
regulators to increase monopoly rents, 25 8 which they can then trade
to interest groups in return for personal benefits such as future jobs
or freedom from criticism. 25 9 Regulators may also derive a direct
psychic benefit from the power they exercise. 260 Thus, the potential
for regulators to pursue their self-interest suggests that Congress
should limit agencies' discretion to expand their regulatory power;
256 See KINGDON, supra note 167, at 47.
257 The adoption of an agency agenda should be treated as a policy statement that is not

binding on the agency and hence not directly reviewable in court. The call for regulatory
measures often arises due to external "focusing events" that occur by happenstance. See id. at
99-103. Therefore, holding an agency to the letter of an announced agenda could seriously
hamper its ability to respond expediently to such events. In addition, direct judicial review
would also threaten to involve the courts in agency management of resources, a task for which
they are not well suited. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 236, at 1282-83. By contrast, the
use of the agenda setting proceeding as part of the record in judicial review of particular cases
of agency inaction would facilitate a task that the courts currently perform hesitantly and too
deferentially. See, e.g., Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 872 F.2d 438, 443-44 (D.C. Cir.
1989); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 819-20 (D.C. Cir. 198i).
2S8 See Levine & Forrence, supra note 123, at r69-7o; Roger G. Noll, The Behavior of
Regulatory Agencies, 29 REv. Soc. ECON. 15, 15-19 (1971); supra note 122 and accompanying
text.
259 This is the theoretical basis for much of the public choice literature on agency capture,
which I discuss in section IV.B.

In

this section, I briefly discuss this problem from the

perspective of the regulator's self-interest rather than the interests of the regulated entity or
other private interest groups.
260 See DowNs, supra note 253, at 84.
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likewise, reviewing courts should not defer to an agency's statutory
interpretation that increases the bounds of the agency's jurisdiction. 26 1
B. Agency Capture by Private Interest Groups
The second potential pitfall of civic republicanism stems from the
ability of an ostensibly regulated industry to influence government
policy. According to the capture hypothesis, instead of providing
meaningful input into deliberation about the public interest, industry
representatives co-opt governmental regulatory power in order to satisf , their private desires. 26 2 Regulated entities are well organized and
generally well funded, and they often have strong interests at stake,
which they do not share with the polity as a whole. These entities
have much to gain by ensuring that they have control over government
decisionmakers and that the decisionmakers whom they do control
remain in office.
Traditional theory posits that interest groups face a much easier
task if they set out to capture an agency than if they try to capture
Congress. 2 63 Often agency staff members have worked in the regulated industry and thus share the industry's perspective and values. 2 64
Many agency staff members expect to work eventually for some regulated entity, at which time they will cash in on the inside knowledge
and experience gained in relatively low paying government positions.
Not wanting to jeopardize this opportunity, they hesitate to criticize
harshly industry proposals and arguments. 265 In addition, well-or-

261 Sunstein argues against deferring to agency interpretations of statutes unless such inter-

pretations are explicitly authorized by Congress, under the principle that "foxes should not guard
henhouses." SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 143-44. I agree with the principle but do not believe
that most questions that require filling the gaps in ambiguous regulatory statutes significantly
enhance agency powers. Jurisdictional questions, however, which involve whether the agency

has the authority even to consider a policy in the first place, directly involve the extent of
agency power. Therefore, courts should not defer to agency interpretations of jurisdictional
provisions.
262 For a comprehensive discussion and evaluation of both the general idea of capture and
the particular mechanisms by which it can come about, see QUIRK, supra note 255.
263 Classic capture theorists assert that commissions that regulate a single industry are
particularly susceptible, because these commissions depend on their industry counterparts to
supply information necessary for effective regulation. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 92-93;

Roger G. Noll, The Social Costs of Government Intervention, in TIHE BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT
RELATION: A REASSESSMENT 56, 61 (Neil H. Jacoby ed., 1974). Public choice theorists contend

that capture can occur whenever an agency sees itself as serving a single group and that group
has well-defined and focused interests. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 123, at 169-70.
Thus, even agencies whose regulatory authority cuts across industries can be captured - for
instance, by a "public interest" group such as environmentalists or by a group such as organized
labor that exerts influence across industries.
264 See QUIRK, supra note 255, at i9-2o.
at ig; ROGER G. NOLL, MERTON

265 See id.

J.

ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 123-24 (973).

PECK & JOHN J.

McGowAN, ECONOMIC
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ganized and well-funded regulated entities can also affect the immediate interests of agency staff members and heads; if these individuals
do not accede to the demands of the regulated entity, they may find
themselves embroiled in numerous adversarial proceedings, which reduce their ability to address other regulatory matters. 266 Finally, it is
easier to influence the few agency members who are responsible for
making ultimate decisions than the hundreds of legislators needed to
pass regulatory bills.
This accepted learning, however, may grossly overstate the susceptibility of agencies to capture relative to the susceptibility of Congress. An agency organized into distinct offices, each filled by professionals from different backgrounds who communicate with a different
clientele, can avoid decisions that reflect a single industry's perspective. Consideration and discussion of regulatory policy by various
departments make that policy less likely to reflect the views of one
group of agency staff members who may be imbued with a particular
industry's values. 26 7 Staff members' understanding that their goal
should be to implement the public interest may further enhance their
tendency to try to reach a universal accord on policy. This understanding may even encourage selection of public servants predisposed
to the use of persuasive discourse. 268
The perception that employment opportunities within a regulated
industry may depend on favoritism by career staff members does
create some potential for agency capture, 269 but this potential is unlikely to be significant. First, because conflict of interest statutes
outlaw exchanges of influence for future jobs, 270 staff members cannot
solicit promises of future employment in exchange for favorable industry treatment. To provide favorable treatment without a guarantee
of future employment is a risky strategy; the staff member may jeopardize her career in the agency. 27 1 Second, although some staff mem-

bers perceive that pro-industry bias helps secure a subsequent industry
job, many staff members do not perceive this. 2 72 Frequently, the

regulated entity hires individuals who will best promote its interests
after they are hired. Thus, it will prefer a staff member who knows
266 See QuiRK, supra note 255, at 17-18; Noll, supra note 258, at 17-19.
267 See GOODSELL, supra note 216, at 132; QUIRK, supra note 255, at 92 ("[T]he collegial
nature of a large part of agency policy making not only limits the centrifugal effect of attitudinal
dissensus, it makes diversity of viewpoints positively functional.").
268 See GOODSELL, supra note 216, at 9o-9I; QuIRK, supra note 255, at 91-92.
269 See QuiRK, supra note 255, at 163-64.
270 See i8 U.S.C. § 203 (1988). In addition, no employee may represent a private entity
before an agency in matters he worked on or supervised in his former official capacity, see id.
§ 207(a), and high level agency staff and agency members may not appear before the agency as
a representative of a private entity within one year after leaving the agency, see id. § 207(c).
271 See QuIRK, supra note 255, at 166-67.
272 See id. at 163-64.
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how the agency operates even if she has previously worked to the
entity's detriment. 273 Third, structuring agencies to involve various
interest groups and staff offices in the policy debate and requiring
agencies to support their decisions with persuasive reasons would
minimize the likelihood that capture of some staff members will cause
the agency to adopt (and to defend successfully on review) a proindustry policy.
Finally, focusing on the difference between the number of members
of Congress who vote on legislation and the number of agency members who vote on regulation creates misperceptions about the relative
ability of special interest groups to capture agencies. Although all
members of Congress have a vote, their choices are dictated to a large
extent by the actions of smaller subcommittees and powerful committee chairs. 2 74 Furthermore, committee staffs play an important role
in legislative decisionmaking, and inducements to favor industry can
be just as great for congressional staff members as for agency personnel. In fact, legislative staff may be more prone to capture because
their work generally occurs behind closed doors, unlike all but the
most informal aspects of agency decisionmaking. 2 75 Finally, special interest groups might enjoy greater influence over legislators than
agency members because legislators are directly elected and hence
more vulnerable to public sentiments that funded interest groups can
generate.
The savings and loans crisis underscores that agency capture may
stem from the interaction between legislative and administrative vulnerability to interest group influence. 2 76 Troubled savings and loans
found it difficult to induce enough career regulators to act on their
behalf, but they were able to sway legislators on the oversight and
budget committees and appropriate agency heads. The crisis thus
demonstrates that even well-meaning agency members respond to the
wishes of legislators who control the agency's authority and budget.
By focusing lobbying efforts on legislators, special interest groups may
be able to capture agencies by threatening agency members' power
and reputation. The crucial point is that special interest groups and
regulated industries often use their influence over powerful members
of Congress to affect regulatory policy.2 77
273See id. at 171-72.
274 See Price, supra note 194, at i58; supra notes 161-167, 196-199 and accompanying text.
275 See Mashaw, supra note 153, at 98--99.
276

For a general discussion of the causes of the savings and loan crisis, see Symposium,

Savings and Loan Crisis:Lessons and a Look Ahead, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 21 (1990).
277 For example, there is general agreement that statutory enactments that were intended to
"aid" savings and loans in the late 197os and early i98os, coupled with direct congressional
influence on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), fueled the savings and loan crisis.
See Edwin J. Gray, Warnings Ignored: The Politics of the Crisis, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
138, 142-43 (i99o); Thomas Romer & Barry R. Weingast, Congress: The Genesis of the Thrift
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The foregoing discussion illustrates why civic republicanism cannot
rely on congressional oversight alone to prevent capture. Some literature addressing the problem that capture poses for a pluralistic understanding of administrative discretion suggests that greater reliance
on presidential oversight would discourage capture. 278 The President,
after all, is accountable to the polity as a whole, not merely to some
subgroup defined by narrow political interests. 279 Implicit in this
reliance is the assumption that the electorate would vote the President
out of office if she catered to special interest groups to the detriment
of the remainder of society. 280 Faced with this possibility, interest
groups would agree to forfeit their own claims as long as they were
assured by the election of a President who opposed special interest
accommodation that the government would not adopt any other in28
terest group's pet project. '
Unfortunately, voters in presidential elections apparently do not
pursue their self-interest perfectly. Presidential politics suffers from
market-type imperfections. There are information costs of determining the extent to which a candidate supports policies that benefit
private interest groups 28 2 and monitoring and policing costs of ensuring that others do not secretly support their special interest candidates. 28 3 More significantly, voters in presidential elections in large
Crisis, 2 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 37, 37-38 (i99o); Michael Waldman, The S&L Collapse: The
Cost of a Congressfor Sale, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 47, 48-50 (1990). Some commentators
have noted that the FHLBB staff adopted accounting standards in i98i that allowed the
precarious health of many savings and loans to go undetected. See Joseph A. Grundfest,
Lobbying into Limbo: The Political Ecology of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 2 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 25, 29-30 (199o); Donald G. Simonson & George H. Hempel, Running on Empty:
Accounting Strategies to Clarify Capital Values, 2 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 92, 95 (1990). One
might thus conclude that capture at the career staff level contributed to the crisis, but it appears
that the FHLBB changed its standards in part out of knowledge that congressional oversight
committees did not want news of savings and loan failures.
278 See Harold H. Bruff, PresidentialPower and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J.
451, 461-62 (1979); Mashaw, supra note 153, at 95; cf. Pierce, supra note 200, at 522 (arguing
that a President can sometimes avoid the wrath of special interests by blaming agency decisions
on the agency's "independence").
279 See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 2oo, at 19o.
280 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 153, at 95.
281 In essence, the threat that interest group members will vote the President out of office

provides the mechanism by which these groups could police a cooperative agreement not to
compete for monopoly rents and thereby avoid the prisoners' dilemma otherwise posed by the
competition for such rents. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 54, at 39-40; Farber
& Frickey, supra note 47, at 906.
282 The economically rational voter calculations that the self-interest model assumes are
complicated by the uncertainty of attributing particular effects to specific governmental policies
and by the lag between the time that the government adopts a policy and the time that policy
ramifications manifest themselves. A candidate from the current administration can always
contend that bad times resulted from the policies of a prior administration or from unfortunate
circumstances beyond the administration's control.
283 Each voter's self-interest would dictate that she secretly vote for her special interest
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measures cast their ballots in accordance with their perceptions of a
candidate's general ideology. 284 These perceptions in turn depend on

media exposure and campaign "packaging" - precisely the benefits
that the television networks and well funded political action committees can provide. 28 5 Hence, there may be a divide between the ideology of the candidate as perceived by the public and the bargains
candidates have struck to garner support from wealthy and well or2 86
ganized interest groups.
Imperfections in presidential oversight of agencies also limit the
ability of the White House to check agency capture. No matter how
great the President's authority to dictate agency policy, the breadth
and complexity of agency action exceeds any one individual's monitoring capacity. 28 7 The President might be able effectively to monitor

a few salient policies, but would have to delegate virtually all of the
responsibility for monitoring others. 28 8 Like congressional delegation
to committee staffs, executive delegation to OMB and the White
House staff abandons the public-interest-oriented and deliberative
structures that made agency policy-setting attractive in the first place.
My rejection of congressional and presidential oversight leaves
interest groups and the courts as the primary institutions to combat
agency capture. Competition between interest groups can provide a
powerful means of identifying and publicizing instances of capture.
To ensure that agencies actually afford different interests equal respect, however, government may have to facilitate the organization
of groups representing diffuse interests and to encourage political
candidate. In such a situation, the uncoordinated behavior of "economically rational" voters
would result in the election of the candidate who played to the most powerful special interests.
284 See David 0. Sears, Richard R. Lau, Tom R. Tyler & Harris M. Allen, Jr., Self-Interest
vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and PresidentialVoting, 74 AM. POL. SC. REV. 670,
679-82 (i98o). To the extent that voters consider the national economy, they tend to look at
the economy during the election year rather than to evaluate the likely effect of the candidates'
programs on national economic prospects. See Ray C. Fair, The Effect of Economic Events on
Votes for President, 6o REV. ECON. & STAT. 159, 171 (1978). But cf MICHAEL S. LEWISBECK, ECONOMICS AND ELECTIONS: THE MAJOR WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 133, 155 (1988)

(contending that American voters do consider the future of the economy as well as their personal
economic well-being).
285 See STEPHEN HESS, THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 78-80 (rev. ed. 1978) (discussing the

role of the networks).
286 The influence of interest groups over the presidential election process may have increased
recently due to the decline of the monopoly that political parties used to exercise over the
nominating process. See ERWIN C. HARGROVE & MICHAEL NELSON, PRESIDENTS, POLITICS,
AND POLICY 162 (1984).
287 See Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEw DIRECTION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 235, 243, 269 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985).
28S See HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS 254 (1977); cf. Hugh Heclo, One

Executive Branch or Many?, in BOTH ENDS OF THE AVENUE 26, 35 (Anthony King ed., 1983)
(stating that a president must impose a "grand simplification," or an overarching theme, if he
is to effectuate his personal policy vision).
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participation by those groups. Creating divisions within the agency,
each with the responsibility to serve certain groups, may also encourage deliberation. Even then, however, competition between private
interest groups will not suffice to prod agencies to pursue the public
interest. At best competition will replace capture that serves a single
interest group with something akin to capture by a coalition of interest
groups - the equilibrium ideal of pluralistic democracy that civic
republicans find normatively wanting. In order to minimize capture
without reinforcing pluralism, it is necessary to rely also on the judiciary to constrain agency decisionmaking.
Civic republicanism suggests three requirements that courts might
impose an agency to guard against capture. Courts should require an
agency to grant meaningful access to all affected groups, honestly
justify its decisions by appeal to the public welfare, and act deliberatively in reaching its conclusion about which policy best serves that
welfare. To implement these requirements, courts should remand
agency decisions for further consideration when the agency does not
actively encourage full participation by groups representing diffuse
interests. Courts should also expand the "hard look" approach to
judicial review of agency action to apply to all agency exercises of
discretion (including statutory interpretation). In addition, the judiciary should demand that the agency explain how it conceives of the
public interest, how that conception comports with the agency's authorizing statute, how the particular policy advances that conception,
and why the arguments opposing that policy are less persuasive.
Although this type of review provides no guarantee against policy
decisions driven by agency capture, it sharply decreases the likelihood
that an agency will adopt such decisions without public scrutiny and
289
publicity.
C. Regulators' Pursuit of Their Own Conception
of the Public Interest
A third potential pitfall of civic republican government is that
decisionmakers will implement their idiosyncratic conceptions of the
289 There is one problem related to capture for which judicial oversight might be less effective
than political oversight. For traditional agencies that regulate particular industries, the existence
of the agency, and hence of staff members' jobs, may depend on maintaining the viability and
the structure of the industry. Agency staff members thus tend not to consider seriously alternatives that might jeopardize the industry's existence. The judiciary, however, may not have
the authority to require the agency to do so, because the agency's authorizing statute usually
implicitly presupposes the industry's viability and structure. See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 66.
Hence, Congress itself needs to adopt legislation that alters the industry structure or restricts
the agency's jurisdiction over the industry, rather than to delegate such decisions to the agency.
For example, it took special legislation and the appointment of Alfred Kahn as Chairman of
the Civil Aeronautics Board to deregulate the airline industry. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK
& PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 55 (1985) (discussing the political impact
of Kahn's appointment).
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public interest rather than society's consensus about that interest.
Pursuit of a personal notion of the public interest may plague congressional as well as agency decisionmaking, at least to the extent that
influential members of Congress enjoy sufficient "slack" from electoral
oversight. 2 90 Nonetheless, the potential may be greater for agency
members to impose their own conception of the public interest on the
rest of society because they are fewer in number and feel no direct
291
electoral constraints.
As in the case of capture, monitoring by private interest groups
may identify when an agency has gone awry, but it will not cure the
problem in a suitable manner. Along with the concern that private
interest group monitoring encourages agencies to seek a pluralistic
equilibrium, there is the added problem that public-interest-minded
decisionmakers are unlikely to be swayed by private interest group
inducements.
Judicial review may help to check despotic regulators, but may
not suffice on its own to avoid this pitfall. Judicial mandates of
participation by all facets of society, deliberation prior to agency
decisionmaking, and justification of the decision in terms of the public
interest (including explanations of deviations from past conceptions)
encourage regulators to think hard about their own conceptions of the
public interest. Review will thus help well-meaning but misinformed
regulators make better decisions. 2 92 The danger still exists, however,
that a justification of an agency decision, cloaked in the language of
public interest, may in fact be based only on a regulator's idiosyncratic
conception of that interest. It may be difficult for courts to determine
whether a regulatory goal couched as advancing some general interest
of the populace is in fact a goal shared generally by the polity or
instead is a community oriented goal imposed by the agency.
The requirement that potentially affected groups participate in the
deliberative process may help courts make this determination, but
only to a limited extent. The record may indicate that many of the
participants in the proceeding opposed a policy for sound reasons to
which the agency decision did not respond. Yet the record often does
not clearly reveal whether an agency policy truly comports with some
shared principle of the common good; full deliberative proceedings
may instead generate obfuscating arguments. A requirement of con-

290 See Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology, supra note 139, at 298; James B. Kau & Paul
H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365,
384 (1979); see also Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups:
How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 8o AM. POL. Sc. REv. 89, 90 (summarizing
literature asserting that members of Congress have sufficient freedom from interest group influence to pursue their own ideological interests).
291 See Levine & Forrence, supra note 123, at 179-81.
292 See Administrative Law Symposium: Question & Answer with Professors Elliot, Strauss,
and Sunstein, 5989 DuKF L.J. 551, 554-55.
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sistency is also not likely to constrain an agency; presumably the
agency would be happy to impose its view of the public good on a
consistent basis. For a reviewing court to check a regulator's imposition of her subjective conception of the public interest, the court
itself would have to determine that her conception deviated from that
of the polity. Giving courts this checking function thus invites judges
to substitute their own conception of the public good, and judicial
conceptions are likely to be more idiosyncratic than those of agency
members because judges are further removed from the give-and-take
293
of politics.
Civic republicanism thus must also look to the politically accountable branches to constrain well-meaning but despotic agencies. In
doing so, however, it must not constrain agencies in a manner that
increases the power of individuals within those branches to override
and control agency policymaking or else it merely invites the replacement of one despot by another. Despite this limitation, the political
branches can meaningfully check runaway regulators in two ways.
First, Congress as a whole can and should directly review agency
policy to ensure that it comports with the polity's conception of the
public good. Congress, although not perfectly deliberative in its legislative process, is accountable to the various factions in society. Although legislative procedures favor factional influence, 294 the bicameral structure of Congress, the presidential veto, and the fact that
the committee system can more easily block legislation than generate
it 29 5 all make it unlikely that a congressional override will replace an
agency policy that serves the public interest with one that explicitly
caters to private interests. Congress thus should play an important
monitoring role, at the end of the deliberative policy-setting process,
to ensure that the agency does not adopt a policy that conflicts with
popular values. 29 6 If Congress can muster the support, statutorily
overruling a particular agency policy is an appropriate use of its
293 Judges' imposition of their idiosyncratic conceptions of the common good can lead to
decisions that oversimplify the issues facing the agency and thereby interfere with the agency's

evaluation of the complex interrelations of technology, political influence, and realities of administration. See SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at r51-56. The result might then be judicially
mandated "bad policy." See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFETY 224-27 (1990); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE

OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 366-73 (1983); Peter L. Strauss, Considering PoliticalAlternatives to
"HardLook" Review, 1989 DUKE L.J. 538, 540, 544-48.
294 See supra notes 161-167, 196-199 and accompanying text.
295 See Lawrence C. Dodd, Congress, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Legitimation, in
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 194, at 390, 411-13.
296 See generally MAASS, supra note 191, at 119-253 (discussing the methods and effectiveness
of congressional oversight of executive policymaking).

Congressional overrides reflect popular

values that have had a chance to develop as part of a deliberative discourse at the agency level.
Therefore, response to such values is more legitimate than initial congressional action, which
reflects responses to preexisting values never subject to such discourse.
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legislative power. One should not, however, rely too heavily on leg-

islative overrides.

For reasons previously discussed, Congress has

difficulty adopting legislation that defines a particular conception of
the public interest. Hence, direct oversight is likely to provide only
a weak constraint; Congress will overrule only agency policy that
varies drastically from the electorate's consensus about the public

interest.
Second, the President can use her appointment power to guard

against regulators who are likely to entertain idiosyncratic views of
the public interest. The President's ability to choose an appointee
who shares her broad conception of the public interest, which presumably comports with the consensus of those who elected her, provides
the most important means of keeping the bureaucracy accountable to
the polity. 29 7 Because appointments of agency members occur relatively infrequently, they attract media attention, which helps ensure

that the entire electorate holds the President accountable for the quality and ideology of the appointee. 298 Thus, the President's appoint-

ment power can provide another check against despotic agencies without unduly empowering the President.

I do recognize that the appointment process has not always worked

to prevent runaway agencies. 2 99 Such agencies are rare, however,
which indicates that meaningful constraints already exist. Moreover,

the President and the Senate have not necessarily seen appointment
power as a primary check against agency despotism. 30 0 If they were
to adopt a civic republican perspective, however, their approach to
297 "By appointing individuals on the basis of loyalty, ideology, or programmatic support,
[the President] can take direct action to enhance responsiveness throughout the administration,
from presidential agencies like the OMB to the most remote independent boards and commissions." Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AmERICAN
POLITICS, supra note 287, at 245. In addition, with respect to independent commissions, the
President's authority to name the chairperson gives the President significant power to implement
her regulatory programs. See DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note 289, at 64, 86-87 (1985).
298 Paul Quirk notes that "it is relatively easy for interest groups concerned about a regulatory
agency to keep informed about appointments to that agency." QuIRK, supra note 255, at 89.
299 For example, some considered the Federal Trade Commission's zealous campaign against
unfair trade practices in the late 1970s to go well beyond its political mandate. The FTC
actions prompted Congress to slash the Commission's budget and to place, for three years,
statutory limits on FTC authority. See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 198o,
Pub. L. No. 96-252, §§ 18-20, 94 Stat. 374, 391-93. President Carter's appointment of an
aggressive consumer advocate, Michael Pertschuk, contributed to this controversy as well. It
is unclear, however, whether the FTC really was a runaway agency, or whether, instead,
Congress's action in i98o reflected changes in the oversight committees' chairmen and the election
of the more pro-business President Reagan. For a review of the perceived problem with FTC
regulation and the possible causes, see Ernest Gellhorn, The Wages of Zealotry: The FTC Under
Siege, 4 REG. 33, 34-40 (1980).
300 Until recently, Presidents had not appointed high level bureaucrats based on the appointees' policy views, but rather to repay political debts or on neutral merit principles. See
QUIRK, supra note 255, at 75-76; Wilson, supra note 123, at 389-90.
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appointments would change and the appointment power would become more significant. The President would appoint agency members
to implement a conception of the public good in line with that of the
voters who elected her and would not treat nominations as political
plums or the means of appeasing powerful interest groups. Senators
would take their advise and consent role seriously to stop an appointment that appears to be a political favor. Similarly, they would oppose
any nominee that they feared did not share a conception of the public
interest acceptable to the polity. With these understandings in place,
the appointment power provides significant protection against regulators' implementing their idiosyncratic conceptions of the public interest.
D. Coercion by the Dominant Political Culture
The possibility that regulators will accede to majoritarian values
and conceptions of the public interest poses an even greater threat to
the civic republican ideal than does the possibility of despotic agencies.
Even if a system of government decisionmaking constrains regulators
to adopt only policies that comported with politically supported conceptions of the common good, policies might still fail to meet the civic
republican ideal. They might reflect a preconceived and inflexible
"mainstream" view of the public interest that many citizens outside
the dominant political culture find odious. Ensuring that regulators
pursue public rather than private interests, and even doing so in a
way that constrains them from imposing their own conceptions of the
30
public interest, does not preclude tyranny by the majority. '
Majority tyranny and its concomitant coercion by the dominant
culture poses a particularly vexing problem for a civic republican
system of government. The system cannot rely on the political process
to prevent such coercion; it is precisely because the dominant culture
maintains so great an influence over the political process that the
problem arises in the first place. The countermajoritarian nature of
courts provides some constraints, but judges too tend to come from
the mainstream of society and do not necessarily understand the interests of minorities and fringe groups. Coercion of minority groups,
however, is not a problem unique to civic republicanism; it plagues
all systems of majoritarian government. 30 2 Adoption of a civic republican system, however, may have a symbolic effect that helps
mitigate such coercion.
301 Madison in particular recognized the troubling nature of majority tyranny. See THE
FEDERALIST No. io, at So-8I (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., g6r). Concerns about
majority tyranny also appear to have motivated some of the recent calls for reviving civic

republican understandings. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note ii, at 1494-99.
302 See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 258-62 (Phillips Bradley
ed. & Francis Bowen trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
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Civic republicanism puts the institutions of government on notice
to watch out for coercion, even if their inherent propensity is to yield
to it. Although a civic republican system has no means of ensuring
that Congress, the courts, or agency officials act in good faith, it does
provide guidance to government institutions, operating in good faith,
to guard against inadvertent accession to majority domination. 30 3 In
particular, it calls for government encouragement and facilitation of
participation by representatives of marginal interests, who can sound
an alarm when government policy becomes tyrannical, 30 4 and sensitivity to the potential for coercion, which counsels against centralized
command-type regulations that leave "outsiders" no option to continue
developing their unique perspectives.
In operational terms, civic republicanism counsels the government
to improve the representation of marginalized groups before agencies.
Congress, the President, and the courts should subsidize the organization and participation of such groups, create divisions within agencies to address the concerns of the disenfranchised, and monitor agencies to ensure that they encourage meaningful participation by
representatives of all potentially affected interests. In addition, the
government should take measures to encourage deliberation. Agency
heads should structure agencies so that primary responsibility for
policy does not rest with a single office responsive to a specific outside
constituency. Agency heads should also recognize and reward cooperative staff problem-solving. Congress should require agencies to
define their agendas in open proceedings and to make public the
content of significant communications even if the communications
occur outside of instituted proceedings. Courts should recognize that
agencies lack incentives to pursue the public interest and require
persuasive explanations of decisions to ensure that they do not represent mere factional deals.
Civic republicanism thus concedes that regulatory coercion of marginal interests by the dominant culture poses a difficult problem. But
majoritarian tyranny poses a problem for all democratic theories.
Unlike other theories, however, civic republicanism denies that the
problem can be skirted simply by cordoning off certain conduct from
majoritarian interference under a notion of rights. Instead, it asserts
that coercion is to be avoided to the extent possible and promotes the
development of a community-wide understanding of goals and prin-

-03oCivic republicanism is not unique in relying on some level of good faith of public officials.
Without any good faith it is doubtful that any government, founded on any political theory,
could operate. This was recognized by the Federalists themselves. See THE FEDERALIST No.
56, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., i96i).
304 Cf. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 73, at 073-74 (noting that agency procedures
allow interest groups to obtain redress without requiring Congress to monitor agency decisions
actively).

1576

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:151I

ciples to achieve this aim. Unfortunately, the theory offers no foolproof means to reach universal consensus; in fact, perfect consensus
is unachievable. This infirmity, however, does not invalidate the civic
republican effort to eliminate coercion. The realistic aim of civic
republican government should be to minimize coercion to the extent
possible, and thereby to promote more just and democratic outcomes.
If one accepts this more realistic aim, the delegation of broad policymaking authority to agencies and the application of appropriate
standards of political and judicial review appear preferable to leaving
such policymaking directly in the hands of Congress. Through such
a process, the unelected institutions of government - agencies, endowed with a professional ethic of seeking a persuasive solution to
regulatory policy, and courts, endowed with the authority to monitor
agency decisions for bias against marginal interests - both get opportunities to check majoritarian tyranny.
V. CONCLUSION

Throughout this century, scholars have proposed various justifications for reliance on an administrative bureaucracy to set basic
government policy. These justifications are incomplete and flawed.
Recently proposed constitutional models based on a revival of select
aspects of republican political theory, however, may provide better
justification for broad administrative policymaking authority.
This thesis is controversial. Most proponents of civic republicanism have called for greater legislative responsibility over government
policy-setting; others have advocated greater judicial control over political processes. Congressional procedures today, however, are unduly
influenced by powerful political factions and are not capable of providing sufficient policy coordination to satisfy civic republicanism's
mandate of deliberate decisionmaking. Congress may better serve the
public interest by checking agency abuses once policy is made. At
the other extreme, courts are too far removed from the values of the
polity to satisfy civic republicanism's goal that citizens determine the
common good. Administrative agencies, however, fall between the
extremes of the politically over-responsive legislature and the underresponsive courts. With proper constraints on bureaucratic decisionmaking, the agencies' place in government, the professional nature of
the agencies' staff, and the procedures agencies have traditionally used
to set policy suggest that the administrative state holds the best promise for achieving the civic republican ideal of inclusive and deliberative
lawmaking.

